Tag Archives: legal positivism

Carlos Santiago Nino

Estoy convencido de que la subsistencia de la controversia entre positivistas jurídicos e iusnaturalistas a través del tiempo se debe a las confusiones que contaminan esta polémica y que impide percibir con claridad qué tesis defiendedn los contrincantes. En realidad, debo ser más drástico, ya que me parece que muchos participantes en esta polémica no tienen mucha claridad sobre las tesis que ellos mismos defienden.

Carlos Santiago Nino, Derecho, moral y política: Una revisión de la teoría general del Derecho, Barcelona, 1994, p. 17

Max Black

Let us grant that a linguist, qua theoretical and dispassionate scientist, is not in the business of telling people how to talk; it by no means follows that the speakers he is studying are free from rules which ought to be recorded in any faithful and accurate report of their practices. A student of law is not a legislator; but it would be a gross fallacy to argue that therefore there can be no right or wrong in legal matters.

Max Black, The Labyrinth of Language, New York, 1968, p. 70

John Dunn

To suppose that there are (positive) legal reasons why a formally valid law can be voided for moral impropriety is a logical error. To suppose that all formally valid laws are morally obligatory is a moral error.

John Dunn, ‘Consent in the Political Theory of John Locke’, The Historical Journal, vol. 10, no. 2 (1967), p. 153-182