[C]ommon-sense deontological morality, standing between egoism and consequentialism, sometimes seems to be caught in a kind of normative squeeze, with its rationality challenged in parallel ways by (as it were) the maximizers of the right and of the left: those who think that one ought always to pursue one’s good, and those who are convinced that one should promote the good of all.
Samuel Scheffler, ‘Agent-Centred Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues’, Mind, vol. 94, no. 375 (July, 1985), p. 415
Scepticism, while logically impeccable, is psychologically impossible, and there is an element of frivolous insincerity in any philosophy which pretends to accept it. Moreover, if scepticism is to be theoretically defensible it must reject all inferences from what is experienced; a partial scepticism, such as the denial of physical events experienced by no one, or a solipsism which allows events in my future or in my unremembered past, has no logical justification, since it must admit principles of inference which lead to beliefs that it rejects.
Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Its Limits, London, 1948, p. 9
La política se hace a veces en la Argentina con fantasías. A veces se cree que los sueldos dependen de la voluntad del gobernante. Hay gente que me pregunta: “¿qué política de sueldos va a tener usted?” Ninguna. Si eso dependiera de una decisión gubernamental, ¿por qué no duplicarlos, por qué no decuplicarlos?
Ricardo López Murphy, La Nación, April 20, 2003, sect. 7, p. 8