Monthly Archives: October 2004

Timothy Sprigge

If one goes for a long time without serious pain, one can more or less forget its distinctive nature. But then, when it comes, one is reminded only too well of what it is like, that is, of its reality as a distinctive quality of experience.

Timothy Sprigge, ‘Is the esse of Intrinsic Value percipi?: Pleasure, Pain and Value’, in Anthony O’Hear (ed.), Philosophy, the Good, the True and the Beautiful, Cambridge, 2000, p. 127

Quentin Smith

Most of the time, we live in an illusion of meaningfulness and only some times, when we are philosophically reflective, are we aware of reality and the meaninglessness of our lives. It seems obvious that this has a genetic basis, due to Darwinian laws of evolution. In order to survive and reproduce, it must seem to us most of the time that our actions are not futile, that people have rights. The rare occasions in which we know the truth about life are genetically prevented from overriding living our daily lives with the illusion that they are meaningful. As I progress through this paper, I have the illusion that my efforts are not utterly futile, but right now, as I stop and reflect, I realise that any further effort put into this paper is a futile expenditure of my energy.

Quentin Smith, ‘Moral Realism and Infinite Spacetime Imply Moral Nihilism’, in Heather Dyke (ed.), Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, Dordrecht, 2003, p. 53

Ayn Rand

He thought of his days going by, of the buildings he could have been doing, should have been doing and, perhaps, never would be doing again. He watched the pain’s unsummoned appearance with a cold, detached curiosity; he said to himself: Well, here it is again. He waited to see how long it would last. It gave him a strange, hard pleasure to watch his fight against it, and he could forget that it has his own suffering; he could smile in contempt, not realizing that he smiled at his own agony.

Ayn Rand, The Fountainhead, New York, 1943, pt. 2, chap. 1

Peter Railton

[W]e may, without realizing it or even being able to admit it to ourselves, develop patterns of behaviour that encourage or discourage specific behaviors in others, such as the unconscious means by which we cause those whose company we do not enjoy not to enjoy our company.

Peter Railton, ‘Moral Realism’, The Philosophical Review, vol. 95, no. 2 (April, 1986), p. 187

Jens Timmermann

According to his early biographers, at a certain point in his life Kant had a ‘maxim’ not to smoke more than a single pipe a day, tempted though he was. He adhered to this maxim rigorously. After a while, however, he bought a bigger pipe.

Jens Timmermann, ‘Kant’s Puzzling Ethics of Maxims’, The Harvard Review of Philosophy, vol. 8 (2000), p. 39