The Church of the fourth century "simply shared the conventional ideas underlying the existing economic order, and the hand-to-mouth methods of dealing with its anomalies and evils" (p. 114). From Dr. Gore comes the still stronger admission that "the modern Church has generally been on the wrong side" (p. xix). Can it be wondered then if we do not find a solution by way of return to the Church and its ideals very hopeful? That individual churchmen can still aid in the development of humanist civilization there is no reason to deny.

T. WHITTAKER.


This book is the first of a series, later volumes of which are to deal with ethics, philosophy of religion, and other philosophical subjects. In an introduction Ruge sketches the scheme of the undertaking, and points out the differences between it and Hegel's Encyclopædia. The present undertaking is to contain contributions from numerous authors, not necessarily in agreement, and it is to take account of the advance of the special sciences since Hegel's time. This volume contains essays by Windelband, Royce, Couturat, Croce, Enriques, and Losskij; and the articles are, as far as I can see, well translated by B. E. Meyer.

I do not think that the scheme of the book is one that enables the contributors to offer their best. They are bound to be very condensed, and the result is that they cannot fully deal with the reasons for their views, or give the latest developments of them. Certainly they fulfil the promise of the introduction by lack of slavish agreement; thus, if Croce's opinions about symbolic logic be true, Couturat's article will not be worth the paper that it is written on, whilst Royce and Enriques will have spent a good part of their lives in futile pursuits.

Windelband contributes a long and careful article in which he deals with the relation of logic to psychology, —descriptive

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and genetic,—to language, and to theory of knowledge. The best contribution is undoubtedly Royce's. He alone deals at any length with inductive logic, and his view that induction does not involve the assumption of any laws of nature but only of laws of probability, seems to me sound. The reasons that he offers for the advanced state of those natural sciences that can be treated mathematically are also plausible; and it is interesting to note his suggestion that as other kinds of order system beside that of numbers are worked out, we may be able to enjoy the advantages of mathematical methods in regions of investigation where quantitative considerations are impossible. I have less sympathy with his attempt to connect the indefinables of logic and mathematics with possible volitions, and certainly do not think that he makes out his case here. But at this point one of the irritating consequences of this form of literature enters, and he has to refer us to a paper of his for a sketch of his real reasons. Still Royce does good service in referring to Kempe's work on the connection between the fundamental concepts of logic and of geometry, though Kempe's theories are also very fully given in the last volume of Schröder.

There is nothing new in Couturat's article on symbolic logic. Practically nothing is said about the Theory of Types, which seems a grave omission; Couturat's own definition of identity seems to me to offend against the theory. He develops shortly a theory of probability, connecting it with the ratio of the number of values which make a propositional function true to the total number of possible values. It is quite likely that probability is connected with functions and not with propositions, but I do not think that Couturat's arguments prove this, and his actual theory seems to me to involve probability when it tries to define it.

Croce's article is mainly of note for its bitter remarks about symbolic logic,—they almost justify the belief that a symbolic logician must at some time have stolen the author's umbrella (and with it his sense of proportion). Enríques denies the necessity for Peano's distinction between 'is a member of' and 'is contained in.' His argument does not seem to me satisfactory. He also thinks that the nature of the laws of logic makes it necessary to postulate certain things about the physical world; e. g., that there are things in it that only very slowly change. This appears to me to be quite a mistake.
Losskij’s article is on the whole sensible; it is strongly realistic in tone, and rather astonishes me by the naïveté, not of its realism, but of the belief that its realism is new. It certainly throws no light on the problems that have been familiar to other people of the same way of thinking (e. g., Russell and Meinong) for years past.

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The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant. By A. D. Lindsay, M.A.
(The People’s Books Series.)

In his foreword Mr. Lindsay assures the reader of his intention not to disregard the warning of Schopenhauer: ‘‘Let no one tell you what is contained in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason.’’’ His purpose, therefore, is simply to state the problems which drove Kant to think out a solution, and to offer a few suggestions which may help those who read Kant himself, to understand that solution. This would certainly be the kind of introduction to any philosopher that an active mind would welcome. No matter how little previous training a man may have had, if he has philosophic curiosity, it is enough to draw his attention to any of the vital problems of metaphysics: henceforward that problem will torment him, and if he is told that Kant has solved it, he will read Kant. The philosophy books in the People’s Series are, presumably, aimed at such minds. But unfortunately, Mr. Lindsay knows too much about Kant’s solution to be able to confine himself to the bare statement of the problem: when he has stated the difficulty, he cannot resist sketching the answer. Without such a sketch it would, of course, be hard to find a place for the suggestions which are to help those who read Kant to understand him better, and in the course of this book Mr. Lindsay gives some very helpful explanations of what is essential to Kant’s position, distinguishing it from what is merely the result of the deposit of previous philosophies, taken over uncritically. Thus he explains that it does not matter to Kant’s argument what type of idealism is assumed: either form of it will fit in equally well with the new position that he wants to establish. From this it follows that many inconsistencies in Kant’s account of idealism, which seem at first upsetting, may