

of experienced content 'outside physics', on the other, its physical cause. Mr. Russell has not shown that the content of perception, of imagination, of memory, and so on, are so many elements in the physical world. A psycho-physical dualism still remains as the only consistent theory.

Prof. Lovejoy has written a book of real importance. His examination and analysis of the present situation in epistemology is worthy of serious attention both because of its acumen and because of its admirable thoroughness. But we doubt whether his 'epistemological dualism' will be generally accepted. Prof. Lovejoy's arguments in connexion with this matter are certainly not strong enough to convince the unbeliever; nor can we see that there is any future for the representative theory of knowledge.

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Studies in Philosophy and Psychology. By G. F. STOUT. Macmillan & Co., 1930. Pp. xiii + 408. 15s.

THIS book is a collection of Prof. Stout's scattered philosophical papers, written during the period of thirty-nine years from 1888 to 1927. All have been published before, mostly in *MIND* or the *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, except the essay "In What Way is Memory-Knowledge Immediate?" (1927). Certain small changes have been made in most of the papers, and the titles of two of them have been altered.

Two of the essays are mainly expository, *viz.*, "The Herbartian Psychology" (1888) and "Ward as a Psychologist" (1926). The former is a very clear and most useful account of the psychological theories of an eminent thinker who is too little read in England. It is much to be wished that Prof. Stout or some other writer with a gift for sympathetic understanding and lucid exposition would write a similar essay on the Herbartian metaphysics. It is obvious that much of the dialectic in Book I. of *Appearance and Reality* was greatly influenced by Herbart. It is also difficult to see the point of several passages in Lotze's *Metaphysics* unless one is acquainted with Herbart's views. Yet, so far as I know, no English translation or commentary exists.

Three of the essays are predominantly psychological, *viz.*, "Voluntary Action" (1896), "Perception of Change and Duration" (1899), and "The Nature of Conation and Mental Activity" (1906). The essential parts of the first and third of these are now, I take it, contained in the *Analytic Psychology* and the *Manual*; but Prof. Stout warns us that he no longer holds that the activity of the self can be ascribed to the mind alone in abstraction from the body which it animates. For the further exposition of his present views of the self

and its activity we must await the publication of his *Gifford Lectures*. (There is a misprint in the essay on voluntary action. On p. 64, l. 30, for "previous" read "pervious"). The contention of the essay on the perception of change is that the earlier parts of a perceived process are not always or often represented during the latter stages by imitative images. This seems plainly true.

The essay on the nature of mental activity incidentally criticises Bradley's views on this subject; and three other essays deal explicitly with Bradley's doctrines. These are "Bradley's Theory of Relations" (1901), "Bradley's Theory of Judgment" (1902), and "Bradley on Truth and Falsity" (1925). The statement of Bradley's theory of judgment seems to me to be fair, and the criticism annihilating. Indeed, the theory collapses at once when stripped of the buckram of metaphor and rhetoric with which Bradley was wont to clothe his doctrines. The essay on Bradley's theory of relations begins with some very odd remarks to the effect that, properly speaking, there can be relations only between discrete terms, and that the adjunction of two finite lines at a point in a longer line composed of them is not a relation. I cannot follow the argument (p. 184) by which this is held to be proved.

After this Prof. Stout deals with Bradley's argument against relations by drawing a distinction between a relation and what he calls "the fact of relatedness" (p. 187). The latter is said to be "a common adjective both of the relation and of the terms" (p. 192). And no relation is needed between a relation or other term and its relatedness, "for the connection is continuous, and has its ground in that ultimate continuity which is presupposed by all relational unity" (p. 192). I find all this obscure to the last degree. How can a *fact* be an *adjective* of anything? If it could, in what sense could it be a *common* adjective of several terms and a relation? The only common adjective would surely be the characteristic of "being a constituent in this fact of relatedness". Again, is it not plain that "continuity" must be used in a totally different sense in Prof. Stout's example on page 184 about the adjoined parts of a line, and in the statement on page 192 about the connection between a term or a relation and its relatedness being "continuous"? Bradley's argument is, no doubt, fallacious. And what Prof. Stout has in mind may be the right answer to it. But, if so, he has certainly failed to state clearly what is in his mind. On the other hand, the criticism of Bradley's theory of truth and falsity in the third of these essays is admirable, and, to my mind, conclusive.

Another essay which explicitly criticises the doctrine of a contemporary thinker is that on "Russell's Theory of Judgment" (1915). This subject is again dealt with in "Real Being and Being for Thought" (1911). The criticism of Mr. Russell's theory in the latter paper (pp. 350 to 352) seems to me to rest on a complete misunderstanding of his doctrine. But all that Prof. Stout has to say on the subject in the first-mentioned paper is highly interesting and important.

Prof. Stout accepts the three conditions which Mr. Russell laid down for any satisfactory theory of judgment, and then adds three further conditions which he thinks equally necessary. The first two of these are plainly true and essential. The third is that "the correspondence of belief with actual fact must be thought of and asserted by the believing mind" (p. 243). This, as stated, seems to me quite incapable of fulfilment. If taken literally, it would involve that every belief either is or presupposes a belief about itself and its own relations to something else. The first alternative is nonsensical, the second would involve a vicious infinite regress of beliefs about beliefs about beliefs. . . . Really, however, it is not what Prof. Stout means. He holds that what we believe is always that a certain determinate value, which we are *contemplating*, and which we *know* to be one *possible* specification of the predicate of a certain determinable fact which we are also contemplating, is the *actual* specification of this determinable fact. Mr. Russell's theory is condemned, rightly, in my opinion, because according to it "the truth of a belief consists in a correspondence between something which the believing mind does not think of at all" (*viz.*, the state of believing) "and something else which it does not think of at all" (*viz.*, the completely determinate independent fact) (p. 250).

Prof. Stout's own views on the nature of judgment, of error, and of knowledge by acquaintance and by description are developed in the essays on "Error" (1902), "Immediacy, Mediacy, and Coherence" (1908), and "Real Being and Being for Thought" (1911). These essays also contain much incidental criticism of Bradley and of Mr. Russell. I have very little doubt that Prof. Stout's positive theory of the nature of judgment and of error is substantially right. At the very least it is much the most important and plausible theory that I know of, even though one might prefer to state some parts of it in rather different phraseology from Prof. Stout's.

The essays on "Some Fundamental Points in the Theory of Knowledge" (1911), and "In What Way is Memory-Knowledge Immediate?" (1927) may be taken together. They both deal with a fundamental doctrine of Prof. Stout's, *viz.*, that we have non-inferential knowledge of the existence and nature of certain particular existents which are not themselves present experiences, and that this knowledge is founded upon and determined by our present experiences. (There seem to be two misprints in the latter paper, on p. 177. In l. 21 for "immediate" read "mediate". In l. 31 read "finite" for "infinite" at the first occurrence of the latter word in the line.)

Prof. Stout's doctrine, just mentioned, is most plausible in the case of memory of past incidents in one's life. It is certain that the memory-judgment is not inferential; it is certain that it is founded upon and determined by some present experience; and it is certain that the remembered event is no longer being experienced. Prof. Stout rules out *a priori* knowledge of particular existents, and

"clairvoyance" (by which I think he must mean a present act of direct acquaintance with a past event), as "miraculous". He considers that we are then forced to accept his doctrine. But surely another alternative is that memory-judgments are not *knowledge*, but only strong belief or opinion. And the same alternative would seem to be open in all the numerous and important applications which he makes of this doctrine. Of course, if we take this alternative, it is difficult or impossible to see how such beliefs or opinions can ever be logically justified. If Prof. Stout put to us the disjunction: "Either there is *some* genuine knowledge of this kind, or no beliefs of this kind have *any* rational ground", I think we might have to accept it. And, if we strain at the second alternative, we should then have to swallow the first. But perhaps, after all, no such beliefs are justifiable, as presumably Hume would have held.

In the essay on some fundamental points in the theory of knowledge Prof. Stout applies this doctrine to two questions, *viz.*, (1) the unity of the self, and (2) the relation between presentations and presented objects. A self is nothing but a set of experiences inter-related in a certain characteristic way. But this characteristic unity of the experiences with each other is determined by the fact that they all refer to and give knowledge of so many different aspects and phases of a single total Object. From this premise Prof. Stout draws, on page 361, an important conclusion which quite certainly does not follow from it alone. Because all the experiences of *each* self must refer to a total object common to *those* experiences, he concludes that there must be a single total object which is common to *all* the experiences of *all* selves, *viz.*, the Universe. It is plain that all that really follows is that there must be a "universe" corresponding to each self; whether these various "universes" are all parts or aspects or phases of a single Universe remains a completely open question.

As regards the second question, Prof. Stout argues that a present experience can be known only as one constituent in a fact which goes beyond it and is also a fact about a presented object which is not a present experience and may not be an experience at all. What is primary is knowledge of such facts, and our knowledge of the presented object and of the presenting experience are thus on precisely the same epistemological level. Here, again, it seems to me that a more sceptical philosopher might consent to go a mile with Prof. Stout, but might refuse to go with him twain. He might substitute "proposition" for "fact", and "belief" for "knowledge", and say that what is fundamental is *belief* in certain *propositions* which are about a presenting experience and a presented object. And he might add that from this belief we can derive *knowledge* of the existence and nature of the presenting experience, but only *belief* about the existence and nature of the presented object. Such a position may be refutable, but it seems consistent with most of Prof. Stout's arguments.

There are two essays which deal explicitly with the problem of the physical world and our alleged knowledge of it, *viz.*, "The Common-sense Conception of a Material Thing" (1900), and "Things and Sensations" (1905). Both are highly interesting and important contributions to the subject.

The last essay in the book is on the "Nature of Universals and Propositions" (1921). This expounds a doctrine which is very dear to Prof. Stout, and which can be traced back in the essays to the days when he was at Oxford, and presumably came under the influence of Cook Wilson. I think that the statement and exposition of the theory would have been much improved if Prof. Stout had distinguished the two quite different correlatives (*a*) substantive and adjective, and (*b*) continuant and occurrent. It seems to me that one part of what he wishes to maintain is simply that a substance or continuant is nothing but a set of occurrents interrelated in a certain characteristic way. There is nothing startling in this view, since an occurrent is a particular and is perfectly determinate in character. The other part of what he wishes to maintain seems to be that, when several precisely similar occurrents are said to be "exactly alike in quality", this relation of exact qualitative likeness is ultimate and is not analysable into the fact that there is a certain peculiar entity called a "determinate quality" which stands in a common relation to all of them. There is nothing startling in this view either. And it is not clear to me that Prof. Stout means to assert anything more than these two views. If so, I think he may very well be right. But I cannot see that he has produced any conclusive reason for rejecting, either the view that a continuant is *not* simply a set of suitably interrelated occurrents, or the view that precise qualitative similarity is analysable in the traditional way. The whole question seems to me to remain completely open in spite of this essay of Prof. Stout's.

I have confined myself mainly to criticism in this review. I would like to add in conclusion (what is hardly necessary in the case of a work by Prof. Stout) that the book as a whole is a contribution of the greatest interest and importance to philosophy. It is a most impressive record of a life spent in the service of the moral sciences, and one cannot read it without being reminded of how much Prof. Stout has done to illuminate and criticise the work of his contemporaries and how much he has himself contributed to the great development of English philosophy in the last forty years.

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