I.—PROFESSOR MARC-WOGAU’S THEORIE DER SINNESDATA

BY C. D. BROAD.

INTRODUCTION.

Professor Marc-Wogau’s Theorie der Sinnesdata is an exceptionally comprehensive book. Four closely connected strands can be distinguished in it. (1) A very full, fair, and clear synopsis of nearly all the most important books and papers by writers who have either used, or considered and explicitly rejected, the ‘sense-datum’ terminology in discussing the philosophy of sense-perception. (2) A positive theory on this subject, which differs from that held by any of these philosophers. (3) An elaborate discussion of certain general philosophical concepts, such as the notions of Thing, Existence, Individual, etc. Marc-Wogau holds that such a discussion is needed, both as the basis for his own theory, and because the writers with whom he is concerned have used these notions uncritically and without drawing the necessary distinctions. (4) Criticisms, both in principle and in detail, on the arguments used and the conclusions reached by the authors whose theories are summarised. These criticisms are based partly on the general results reached in what I have called Strand 3, and are partly independent of these. Their primary object is to show that conclusions at variance with Marc-Wogau’s own theory are at any rate unproven. But many of them are of independent interest.

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In discussing the book I shall ignore Strand 1 almost entirely; for I find very little to criticize in Marc-Wogau's accounts of other men's theories, and there is no point in summarizing summaries. I shall concentrate my attention mainly on Strands 2 and 3. In connexion with Strand 4 I shall consider only those criticisms of principle which are an important part of Marc-Wogau's defence of his own theory, and some few of the detailed criticisms which happen to have interested me specially.

(A) Preliminary Remarks on Terminology. Before going further I wish to state and exemplify the terminology which I am going to use in discussing the problems raised by Marc-Wogau. It is obviously very important to have a terminology which does not beg any of the numerous questions at issue in his book. It may be remarked that Marc-Wogau confines himself almost entirely to cases of visual perception. I shall do this also, though I think that the tendency among philosophers to make this restriction has had a most unfortunate effect on their treatment of the problems of sense-perception. In any case the terminology which I shall use could very easily be adapted to tactual and to auditory perception.

The most general term which I shall use is Visual Experience. A feature common and peculiar to all such experiences is that they are experiences of colour, if we include under that heading black, white, and grey as well as the various hues.

Now visual experiences may be sub-divided as follows. There are some which the person who is having them would naturally describe at the time by saying 'I am seeing so-and-so' or 'I seem to see so-and-so', or which he would describe in retrospect by saying 'I saw so-and-so' or 'I seemed to see so-and-so'. We will call these Ostensible Visual Perceptions. There are others which the experient would naturally describe by saying 'I had such and such a mental image' or 'I saw so-and-so in my mind's eye'. We will call these Visual Imagings. We shall be concerned only with Ostensible Visual Perceptions.

An ostensible visual perception can be considered from two points of view. (i) We can ask: 'Is there in fact an object answering to the description which the experient gives of the object which he claims to be seeing, and is he in fact perceiving such an object?' This question can be put in the form: 'Is the ostensible visual perception veridical or non-veridical?' (ii) We can ask: 'Is the ostensible visual perception evoked by light coming to the percipient's eyes from an external object?' This question can be put in the form: 'Is the ostensible visual perception normally evoked or abnormally evoked?'
The answer to the second question often has a very close connexion with the answer to the first. An ostensible visual perception which is abnormally evoked is generally wholly or largely non-veridical. An ordinary dream, or the visual experiences of a delirious waking person, are examples of ostensible visual perceptions which are both abnormally evoked and non-veridical. But the questions are different, and it is important to distinguish them for the following reasons. (i) There are plenty of ostensible visual perceptions which are normally evoked but are non-veridical. Examples would be the experience called 'seeing a mirage' and in general any kind of optical illusion. (ii) In the records of psychical research there is extremely good evidence for the occurrence of ostensible visual perceptions which are abnormally evoked but are veridical. Examples are certain dreams and waking hallucinations which agree with certain contemporary but remote scenes and events to a degree which it would be fantastic to ascribe to chance-coincidence. Even if all such evidence were rejected, it would plainly be undesirable to adopt a terminology which ruled out the possibility of such cases by definition. So I shall sub-divide ostensible visual perceptions into veridical and non-veridical, and I shall subdivide each of these classes into normally evoked and abnormally evoked.

I think that the word 'see' is commonly used in such a way that it would be incorrect to say that a person was 'seeing' so-and-so unless one believed that he was having an ostensible visual perception which was both veridical and normally evoked. Suppose that one was describing what one knew to be a dream or a waking hallucination. Then, even if one knew that it corresponded to some distant contemporary scene to a degree beyond all question of chance-coincidence, one would say 'He (or I) seemed to see so-and-so', and not 'He (or I) saw so-and-so'. Suppose that one was describing what one knew to be a misperception. Then, even if one knew that it was normally evoked, one would use some such phrase as, e.g., 'I seemed to see a man pointing a gun at me, but what I really saw was a scarecrow in the twilight'.

Now, whatever may be the case with certain other kinds of sensible experience, e.g., those of taste or of smell, the following seems to be true of all or nearly all visual experiences, and certainly of all those which could be described as ostensible visual perceptions. It is natural to describe such experiences by using a transitive verb, viz., 'see' or 'seem to see', followed by a grammatical object which consists of a general name or an explicit description, e.g., 'a penny', 'a flash of lightning', 'a
brown flat disk', 'a blue cross on a red field', and so on. I shall express the fact which I take to lie behind this linguistic usage by saying that in any ostensible visual perception there can be distinguished two factors, viz., an act of awareness and an object of awareness.

Now suppose that a person is describing an ostensible visual perception which he is having. He will very often use the expression 'I see a so-and-so', where 'so-and-so' is either a general name for a class of material things, e.g., 'penny', or is an explicit description of a material thing, e.g., 'flat round disc made of copper and used as a coin'. If he does this, he is using a description which plainly asserts or implies a great deal more than is guaranteed by his present visual experience alone. E.g., to call an object a 'penny' implies that it is something that could be felt as well as seen, something which other people could see and touch, something made of copper and issued by the British mint as a coin, and so on. The expression 'I see a penny' might be used equally by a person in any of the following situations. (i) A person who was looking straight down on a penny lying on his table before him. (ii) A person who was looking so obliquely at a penny lying on his table that it looked elliptical and not round. (iii) A person under hypnotic suggestion who had a visual hallucination of seeing a penny on his table, though there was in fact no such object there at the time. In the second of these examples he says, and says correctly and truly, that he is seeing a penny, i.e., a round object. But, if he were to confine himself to describing the object of his awareness as it here and now looks to him, he would have to say that he is aware of an object that looks elliptical. In the third of these examples he is altogether mistaken in saying that he sees a penny, though he may be using the word 'see' correctly relatively to his beliefs at the time; for his ostensible perception is neither veridical nor normally evoked. He would admit this when he recovered his normal state and it was explained to him that he had been hypnotized. But, if he had confined himself to saying: 'I have a visual awareness of an object that looks brown, and flat and round and, in short, penny-like', there is no reason to suppose that he would have been mistaken.

For these reasons it is essential to distinguish conceptually the following two notions, viz., (i) the object which is visually apprehended, and (ii) the object which is ostensibly seen, in any ostensible visual perception. The distinction may be drawn as follows. Suppose that the experient, in describing such an experience, were to confine himself to describing how its object here and now
looks to him. Then I should call the object thus described a visual prehensum; and I should say that it is visually prehended as having those characteristics and only those which the experient would ascribe to it if he confined himself entirely to describing how it here and now looks to him. Suppose, on the other hand, that the experient, in describing his ostensible visual perception, does not thus limit himself. He describes it by reference to an object which he asserts or implies to have characteristics other than those which are here and now visually presented to him. He does this, no doubt, on the basis of his present visual prehension, but he goes beyond (and perhaps even against) what he here and now visually prehends. Then I should call the actual or possible object thus described an ostensible visum.

The examples given above illustrate the following facts. (i) There may be nothing at all corresponding to the ostensible visum of an ostensible visual perception, i.e., nothing actual which remotely answers to the description of that possible object. In that case the visual experience may be described as wholly delusive. But there will still be a certain visual prehensum, and there may be no reason whatever to doubt that it has the properties which the experient would ascribe to it. (ii) The description of the ostensible visum will always include or imply properties which are not visually prehended in the prehensum. Some of these may be properties which could not be visually prehended, e.g., coldness and smoothness. Some of them may be properties which could not be sensibly presented at all, because they involve what I call 'categorial characteristics' such as cause and substance. Examples would be causal and dispositional properties, such as impenetrability, mass, etc. (iii) The description of the ostensible visum may include or imply a certain determinate characteristic which could be visually prehended but which differs specifically from one which the prehensum is prehended as having. E.g., when the penny is viewed very obliquely the prehensum is prehended as elliptical, but the description of the ostensible visum as a "penny" implies that the latter is round. But in this case there is something answering to the description of the ostensible visum. The ostensible visual perception here may be said to be wholly veridical. For the ellipticity which the prehensum is prehended as having does not lead the percipient to ascribe ellipticity to the visum; on the contrary, in conjunction with certain other features in the total prehensum, it leads him to ascribe roundness to the visum. (iv) There are plenty of intermediate cases where there is good reason to believe that an ostensible visual perception is neither wholly delusive nor wholly veridical. There is
something actual which answers in the main to the description of the ostensible visum, and which the percipient is perceiving; but it differs in certain details from the latter. In such cases we may say that the visual experience is \textit{veridical in principle but delusive in certain details}.

When an ostensible visual perception is not wholly delusive we can talk of its \textit{actual visum}, and we can compare this with the description of that possible object which is its ostensible visum.

I can hardly hope that this terminology is impeccable, but I hope that it may serve. It is intended to leave open for discussion the following questions. (i) Suppose that there is an actual visum, answering completely or in principle to the description of the ostensible visum of a certain visual experience. What is the relation of the visual prehensum to the actual visum? Are they necessarily \textit{different} entities, inter-related in some specially intimate way? Or is it possible that the visual prehensum and the actual visum may be \textit{one and the same entity} under different descriptions, as, \textit{e.g.}, the Prime Minister of England and the Leader of the House of Commons might be? (2) If this is possible, is there any good reason for or against holding that it is true? (3) Is it possible for a visual prehensum to have characteristics \textit{besides} those which it is visually prehended as having, \textit{e.g.}, to be in fact cold and smooth as well as brown and elliptical? (4) Is it possible for a visual prehensum to have characteristics \textit{incompatible with} some of those which it is visually prehended as having, \textit{e.g.}, to be in fact round though it is visually prehended as elliptical? It is plain that the answers to Questions 3 and 4 may have an important bearing on the answers to Questions 1 and 2. These are the kind of questions which Marc-Wogau is mainly concerned to discuss, and I am naturally anxious to use a terminology which shall not beg any of them.

(B) Preliminary Sketch of Marc-Wogau's Theory. We can now give a very rough preliminary sketch of Marc-Wogau's main contentions in Strands 2 and 3. I think that the following are the most important points.

(1) He thinks that most writers who would commonly be described as supporters of some form of the Sense-datum Theory have held that the visual prehensum and the actual visum are \textit{different} entities even when the visual perception is wholly veridical. They have held various views about the nature of the actual visum, and correspondingly various views about the nature of the relation between the visual prehensum and the actual visum. But they have never admitted that the visual prehensum and the actual visum could be one and the same entity under
different descriptions; and they have produced many arguments to show either that this is impossible or that it is never in fact true.

(2) Most of them have either explicitly asserted or tacitly assumed that a visual prehensum can have no characteristics besides those which it is visually prehended as having, and a fortiori that it can have no determinate characteristic incompatible with any which it is prehended as having. If either of these contentions is admitted, Question 1 above must be answered in the following way. A penny, e.g., is certainly a round hard thing made of copper; and what I visually prehend when I look at a penny is never prehended as hard or made of copper, whilst it is prehended as elliptical and not as round if I am looking very obliquely at the penny. Therefore, unless what I visually prehend can have certain characteristics besides those which I prehend it as having, and certain determinate characteristics incompatible with some of those which I prehend it as having, it cannot be identical with the penny which is the actual visum.

(3) Marc-Wogau holds that in certain cases, e.g., when a penny is looked at directly and not very obliquely from about arm's length in normal light by a person in the mental attitude of ordinary practical life, there is no reason to doubt that what is visually prehended is in a certain sense identical with the actual visum, i.e., with the penny itself. In other cases, e.g., when the penny is looked at in a very oblique direction or from a very great distance or when the observer is in certain other mental attitudes, the visual prehension is certainly not identical in that sense with the actual visum. It is then an entity which stands in a certain peculiar relation to a certain other qualitatively different entity, viz., the penny itself. In such cases, and a fortiori in wilder cases, such as vision in a mirror, waking hallucination, dreaming, etc., it is proper to speak of the visual prehensum as a 'sense-datum'.

It will now be clear why Marc-Wogau discusses certain very general problems which are not usually treated explicitly by writers on the philosophy of sense-perception. The fundamental question at issue is whether the prehensum and the actual visum of a visual perception are ever identical or must always be different. Therefore the various meanings of 'identity' and 'difference' need to be discussed. Again, the actual visum is in general a material thing, e.g., a penny. Therefore it is necessary to discuss the notion of 'material thing'. In particular it is desirable to consider the following two notions, viz., (i) the identity of a thing through time and change, and (ii) the relations between one thing and its many appearances at a given moment.
Now among the reasons which have been given for holding that the visual prehensum and the actual visum are always different the following have been prominent. (i) It has been alleged that the prehensum of any visual experience certainly exists, whilst it is always possible to doubt whether anything exists answering to the description of the ostensible visum. (ii) It has been alleged that the visual prehensum is always a particular individual, whilst a material thing is of a different logical type, e.g., a class. It is therefore desirable to clear up the notions of 'existence' and of 'particular individual' and to point out any ambiguities which may lurk in them.

Marc-Wogau's discussions of these several very general problems occur at various parts of his book, interspersed between the treatments of much more detailed problems specially concerned with sense-perception. It seems to me to be convenient, now that I have explained why Marc-Wogau thinks it necessary to deal with these general problems, to take them all together and to clear them out of the way at the beginning. For Marc-Wogau's arguments and conclusions about specific problems in the philosophy of sense-perception depend in part on his answers to these general questions.

SECTION I. GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

Under this heading I shall treat in turn Marc-Wogau's discussion of the following topics. (A) Particular Individuals, (B) Identity and Difference, (C) Existence, and (D) Material Things. (The order in which I take them is not in all cases the same as that in which they occur in Marc-Wogau's book.)

(A) Particular Individuals. Marc-Wogau's discussion of this topic is to be found in Chapter III, which is entitled On Individual and Universal Objects. I must confess that I do not find it easy to follow, and it is quite likely that I have only imperfectly understood it.

One thing at least is certain. Marc-Wogau holds that the notion of a particular individual presupposes the notion of what he calls a 'Bestimmungs komplex'. This has to be distinguished from what he calls a 'Bestimmung', whether compound or non-compound. We must now try to grasp these notions by means of Marc-Wogau's statements and illustrations.

We are told, on the top of page 156, that the word 'Bestimmung' is used in the book in a wider and a narrower sense. In its wider sense it means 'anything that can be predicated in any sense of any object'; so it can presumably be translated by
When it is used in this sense Marc-Wogau says that certain Bestimmungskomplexe are also Bestimmungen. So it appears that some (though presumably not all) Bestimmungskomplexe are predicates. But in the present context the word 'Bestimmung' is used in a narrower sense. As regards this we are told (i) that no Bestimmungskomplex is a Bestimmung in this sense, and (ii) that every Bestimmung in this sense is a 'determinable or determinate'. It is not asserted that every determinable or determinate is a Bestimmung in this sense; but this is not denied, and I suspect that it is intended.

Examples of Bestimmungen in the narrower sense are 'red', 'triangular', and 'equilaterally triangular'. It seems to me that what is common and peculiar to all of them is that each is a certain relatively determinate form of a certain relatively indeterminate predicate. Thus, to be red is to be coloured in a certain way; to be triangular is to be shaped in a certain way; and to be equilaterally triangular is to be triangular in a certain way. If so, we may perhaps translate 'Bestimmung', in the narrower sense, by the phrase 'specified generic predicate'.

Marc-Wogau points out that there are two different kinds of specified generic predicate. 'Red' is an example of the one, and both 'triangular' and 'equilaterally triangular' are examples of the other. The difference may be put as follows. 'To be red' is simply to be coloured redly. One cannot express the differentia between the specific predicate 'red' and the generic predicate 'coloured' except by repeating the word 'red' (or some linguistic equivalent of it) in an adverbial form. But 'to be triangular' is to be a rectilinear plane figure with three sides, and 'to be equilaterally triangular' is to be triangular with equal sides. Here the differentia can be analysed and expressed in independent terms. We could make a person understand what it is to be triangular, even though he had never seen an instance of triangularity, provided that he understood what it is to be a rectilinear plane figure and was acquainted with the notion of cardinal numbers in general and the number three in particular. Marc-Wogau calls specified generic predicates of the former kind 'non-compound' (einfach), and those of the latter kind 'compound' (zusammengesetzt). He points out that a predicate which is non-compound in this technical sense may yet be 'complex' (komplex) in another sense. Anything that is red, e.g., has redness of a certain shade, a certain intensity, and a certain saturation. I propose to call such factors as these 'dimensions of comparability'. (In the case of sound, e.g., the dimensions of comparability are pitch, loudness, and tone-quality.) Thus we may...
Marc-Wogau’s doctrine here by saying that a specified generic predicate which is non-compound, in the sense that its differentiae cannot be analysed and expressed in independent terms, may yet be complex, in the sense that it has several dimensions of comparability.

We come now to Bestimmungskomplexe. The predicate of ‘being a red triangle’ is given as an example. If we compare this with the predicate ‘equilaterally triangular’ or ‘intensely red’, we see that the difference may be put as follows. To be equilaterally triangular is to be triangular in a certain way; and the same is true mutatis mutandis of being intensely red. But it would be nonsensical to describe an object which was red and triangular as either ‘redly triangular’ or ‘triangularly red’. It is redly coloured and triangularly shaped. The connexion between the two relatively indeterminate predicates of ‘being coloured’ and ‘being shaped’, and the consequent connexion between the relatively determinate form of the one and the relatively determinate form of the other (e.g., between being redly coloured and being triangularly shaped) which happen to belong to the same object, is something unique and peculiar. It is obviously completely different from the connexion between a relatively indeterminate predicate and the relatively determinate form of it which happens to belong to a certain object, e.g., between the predicate of being triangular and that of being equilaterally triangular in the case of an object which happens to be an equilateral triangle.

I propose to call it ‘compresence’. It must be understood that this phrase is not intended to imply or to exclude any particular theory about substance and attributes.

I have stated all this in my own way, but I think that it agrees with what Marc-Wogau has in mind. I will now add the following remarks. In the case of a Bestimmungskomplex we are concerned with what might be called ‘relatively contingent compresence’. It is, perhaps, necessary that anything which has colour should have shape, and that anything which has shape should have colour. On that question I do not wish to express a decided opinion here. But, if a certain thing is, e.g., red and triangular, its redness and its triangularity are contingent to each other. It might have been red and had any other shape, and it might have been triangular and had any other colour.

Marc-Wogau points out that such a complex predicate as ‘red-and-hard-and-circular’ is the most elementary kind of Bestimmungskomplex. Consider the case of an object which might be described as a circular area with one half red and the other half green. The predicate here is also an example of a
Bestimmungskomplex. Plainly the predicates ‘red’ and ‘green’ are contained in it in a different way from that in which the predicates ‘red’, ‘hard’ and ‘circular’ are contained in the Bestimmungskomplex ‘red-and-hard-and-circular’. So we must recognise that a Bestimmungskomplex may have a very elaborate internal structure.

Marc-Wogau says that certain predicates can, and others cannot, be combined into a Bestimmungskomplex. He says that this is an ultimate fact. The examples which he gives to illustrate this alleged fact are the following. ‘Red’ and ‘triangle’ can be so combined; ‘red’ and ‘hard’ cannot; but ‘red’ and ‘hard’ and ‘surface’ can.

I suppose that the ground for his statements is the following. It is grammatically correct to describe an object as ‘a red triangle’ or as ‘a red hard surface’; but it is not grammatically correct to talk of ‘a red hard’ or a ‘hard red’. It seems to me that there is nothing substantial in this distinction, and that it depends simply on a contingent peculiarity of the English and the German languages. We happen to have a substantive-word ‘triangle’ for surfaces whose shape is triangular, but no substantive-word for surfaces whose texture is hard or surfaces whose colour is red. Suppose that we could talk of ‘a red’ or ‘a hard’, as we can talk of ‘a triangle’. Then we could talk of ‘a triangular red’ as well as of ‘a red triangle’. And we could talk of ‘a red hard’ or ‘a hard red’. In all these cases the predicate can be expressed by such phrases as ‘red-and-triangular’ or ‘red-and-hard’; and then all appearance of the alleged difference vanishes. In both cases it is presupposed that the object is, or has, a surface; for each of the predicates ‘red’ and ‘triangular’ and ‘hard’ is a specific modification of a generic characteristic which can belong only to extended objects.

We come next to the case of common nouns, e.g., ‘book’ or ‘penny’, used as predicates, e.g., in such phrases as ‘That is a book’ or ‘There is a penny on the table’. Marc-Wogau holds that these express a certain special sub-class of Bestimmungskomplexe. I take it that what he means is this. By describing an object as ‘a book’ or a ‘penny’ we are ascribing to it a complex predicate composed of relatively contingent component simpler predicates; although these simpler predicates are not explicitly named, as when we describe an object as a ‘red hard triangle’. A common noun, used predicatively, may be said to express an implicit Bestimmungskomplex.

Finally we come to the objects denoted by such phrases as ‘This X’, where ‘X’ is either an explicit Bestimmungskomplex-phrase,
e.g., 'red hard triangle', or an implicit *Bestimmungskomplex*-phrase, e.g., 'book' or 'penny'. According to Marc-Wogau, any such phrase denotes a *Bestimmungskomplex* of the following peculiar kind. Among its constituents are included a *local* and a *temporal* predicate, and these are *completely determinate*. If I understand him aright, the phrase 'This red hard triangle', e.g., denotes what might be otherwise expressed by the phrase 'Redness, hardness, and triangularity compresent here now'. And I suppose that the phrase 'this penny' would denote what might be otherwise expressed by the phrase 'Such and such predicates (viz., those which constitute a definition or description of a penny) compresent here now'.

There are two explanatory comments to be noted here. (i) It is admitted that one might look at a certain object and say of it correctly and truly: 'That table was in my grandfather's house. I inherited it. It has been away to be polished and has lately come back'. For an account of Marc-Wogau's complete treatment of this the reader must wait until he comes to Sub-Section D of the present Section of this paper, where I deal with the concept of Material Thing. It must suffice for the present to say that, according to Marc-Wogau, the primary sense of 'This table' is that in which it applies to a *Bestimmungskomplex* in which the local and the temporal predicate-constituents are both completely determinate. The sense in which it applies to the table as an enduring continuant with a variegated history is derivative from this.

(ii) According to Marc-Wogau, it is *only* the local and the temporal predicate which must be completely determinate when such a phrase as 'This table' is used in the primary sense. The other predicates which are either explicit or implicit constituents of such a *Bestimmungskomplex* may be, and generally are, incompletely determinate.

Now Marc-Wogau identifies a *Particular Individual* with a *Bestimmungskomplex* of the kind just described, *i.e.*, with one which contains as constituents a perfectly determinate local and temporal predicate and as other constituents other kinds of predicate which need not be completely determinate.

He proceeds to compare this account of particulars with others that have been given by eminent philosophers, *e.g.*, Russell, Stout, and Johnson. I do not propose to consider these comparisons in detail; but it will be worth while to notice certain statements which occur in them, because they throw light on Marc-Wogau's own theory.

(i) It has been said that universals and particulars may be distinguished by the fact that universals *have* instances, whilst
particulars are instances of universals but do not have instances. Marc-Wogau rightly says that, if we are to make use of this, we must clear up the notion of 'instance'. He then embarks on a long and difficult discussion which occupies pages 170 and 171 of his book.

It seems to me that this discussion would be greatly simplified if one began by pointing out that the word 'instance' is used in the following two senses. (a) It would be in accordance with usage to say: 'Scarlet is an instance of red' or 'An oak is an instance of a tree'. In this sense 'instance of' means 'determinate under' or 'species of'. (b) It would also be in accordance with usage to remark, on seeing a red flash or pointing to a tree, 'That is an instance of red' or 'That is an instance of a tree', as the case might be. Here 'instance of' means 'determinately dated and localised occurrence of'. A universal has instances, in the sense of sub-species or determinates under it, unless it happens to be completely determinate. It has, or may have, instances, in the sense of determinately dated and localised occurrences, whether it is or is not completely determinate.

Now it is true that a determinately localised and dated occurrence of scarlet, e.g., is ipso facto a determinately localised and dated occurrence of red, just because scarlet is a determinate under red. It is also true that each is a particular. But it does not follow that a particular can have instances in either of the two senses in which a universal can do so. Scarlet-here-now is not an instance of red-here-now, either in the sense in which scarlet is an instance of red, or in the sense in which scarlet-here-now is an instance both of scarlet and of red. For scarlet-here-now is not a species of red-here-now; it is not a species of, or determinate under, anything. And it is not a determinately localised and dated occurrence of red-here-now; it is such an occurrence of scarlet and equally of red. I think it is plain, then, that Marc-Wogau is right in saying that, on his view of particulars, a particular would not have instances in either of the two senses in which a universal may have instances.

(ii) In comparing his view with the doctrine, asserted by both Johnson and Russell, that a distinguishing mark of a particular is that it can function in a proposition only as a logical subject, Marc-Wogau makes the following remark. There is, he says, a fundamental question which can be raised about both these philosophers. Do they regard a logical subject as (a) a complex whole in which its predicates can be distinguished as constituent factors, or (b) something which remains over when one abstracts from all its predicates? He says that, on the first alternative,
their view need not be (though of course it might be) fundamentally different from his own, according to which a particular is a Bestimmungskomplex containing a completely determinate local and temporal predicate. On the second alternative, he says, there would be a radical difference.

Now it seems to me that Marc-Wogau has not distinguished enough alternatives here. I should have thought that at least the following three need to be distinguished. (1) That a particular is a complex whole whose only elements are its predicates. (2) That it is a complex whole which contains its predicates as elements, but also contains an element of an entirely different kind from any predicate. (3) That, whether it be complex or not, it does not contain any of its predicates as elements. I take it that Marc-Wogau’s theory is a form of Alternative 1. A person who accepted Alternative 2 might hold either (a) that the non-predicative element in a particular could occur in isolation, or (b) that it could not. It should be noted that a person who held Alternative 2 would be very liable to use the word ‘particular’ or ‘substance’ ambiguously. He might use it sometimes to mean the complex whole composed of the predicates and the non-predicative element, and sometimes to mean the non-predicative element in such a whole. He would be specially liable to make this confusion if he held Alternative 2 in the Form b, i.e., if he thought that the non-predicative element in a particular cannot occur except in combination with predicates to form a particular. We might avoid this ambiguity by using the word ‘hypostasis’ for the alleged non-predicative element, and the word ‘substance’ or ‘particular’ for the complex whose elements are an hypostasis and a number of predicates.

I take it that, on Marc-Wogau’s view, a particular might be symbolised by some such formula as \( R(P_1, P_2 \ldots ; s, t) \). Here \( P_1, P_2, \) etc., represent predicates, other than those of local and temporal position, which may be relatively indeterminate. The letters \( s \) and \( t \) represent respectively a perfectly determinate spatial position and a perfectly determinate date. They are separated from \( P_1, P_2, \) etc., by a semi-colon to show that they perform a unique function in the complex, quite unlike that of the other predicates. The \( R \) outside the bracket represents a unique mode of relationship or form of union or ‘bond’ or ‘tie’, which I have called ‘compreence’.

Alternative 2 would be represented by some such formula as \( S(\theta ; P_1, P_2 \ldots ; s, t) \). Here \( \theta \) represents the non-predicative element which I have called an ‘hypostasis’; and \( S \) represents a bond between factors of three different kinds, viz., the
hypostasis, the non-spatio-temporal predicates, and the local and temporal positional predicates.

(iii) It has been said that a particular is something which is completely determinate in every respect. Marc-Wogau has to consider how this is related to his doctrine that a particular is a Bestimmungskomplex in which only the local and temporal predicates need be completely determinate.

Let us simplify the question at the outset, as Marc Wogau does, by confining our attention to the case of a visual prehensum. It does seem to me that a visual prehensum must have a certain completely determinate colour, shape, extension, etc., as well as a certain completely determinate date and position in a certain visual field. In having these determinates it will, of course, ipso facto have all the less determinate predicates under which any of them fall. But it seems to me unintelligible to suggest that a determinable predicate could be manifested at a certain time and place without being there and then manifested in a certain perfectly determinate form. On the other hand, I have no difficulty in admitting that a prehended particular, e.g., a visual prehensum, may be, and perhaps always is, prehended as having characteristics which are not completely determinate. One could say that it is 'circular or nearly so', 'scarlet of a light shade and considerable intensity' and so on; but one could not go further than this. (In the case of colours and of most shapes we have no names for perfectly determinate forms. So, even if one prehended a particular as having a certain perfectly determinate colour and shape, one could not express in words anything more than a certain relatively indeterminate colour and shape under which these determinates fall.)

Before concluding this sub-section I will make some general remarks about the theory of particulars of which I take Marc-Wogau's theory to be an instance.

(1) It has its maximum plausibility when confined to visual prehensa. It is not unplausible to hold that, when we say that a scarlet visual prehensum exists, we mean simply that scarlet is now being manifested in a certain position in a certain visual field. But even in this case the expression 'scarlet-here-now', which is often given as the right translation, is terribly inadequate. 'Here', e.g., does not distinguish between one position in a visual field and other simultaneous positions in it. A scarlet and a blue visual prehensum, or for that matter two scarlet visual prehensa of precisely the same shade, shape, and size, may co-exist in the same visual field. Again, they may exist in different contemporary visual fields.
(2) Then something must be said about the shape and extension of a visual prehensum. At the very least it must be described as a certain area in a certain position in a certain visual field pervaded by a certain colour during a certain period. When all this has been added one wonders whether the visual field is not being treated as a kind of hypostasis; a kind of Substantival Absolute Space waiting ready to be 'inherited' here or there by this or that colour. Perhaps the answer that would be made is that, while 'inheritance' in general is a vague unintelligible term, the notion of the pervasion of an area of a visual field by a colour is clear and intelligible.

(3) The complication increases when we pass from particulars to which only one kind of predicate, e.g., colour, is ascribed to particulars which are described, e.g., as brown and cold and hard and round. What is the analysis of 'comprevence' when these very different kinds of predicate are said to be compresent in a certain perfectly determinate position at a certain date? And what kind of space is it that houses these very different predicates?

(4) So far we have spoken only of those predicates which are qualities, e.g., redness, coldness, etc. But a very important class of predicates in the case of a material thing or a person are its dispositional properties, e.g., its melting-point, its density, its electrical conductivity, and so on. Can the inheritance of these in a particular be dealt with on the same lines as that of pure qualities, viz., by talking of 'comprevence' in a certain position at a certain date? And, if so, will not the notion of compresence need to be modified still further?

(B) Identity and Difference. Marc-Wogau discusses this subject from page 90 to page 102. He begins by distinguishing three kinds of difference, which he calls numerical, qualitative, and abstractive.

Numerical difference can be predicated when and only when we can properly speak of two or more objects.

He gives three examples of qualitative difference. (i) Two predicates can be said to be qualitatively different if they cannot both at the same time and in the same respect be applied to the same subject. 'Red all over' and 'blue all over' would thus be qualitatively different predicates. (ii) Two Bestimmungskomplexe may be qualitatively different. The examples given are 'red sphere', 'green sphere', and 'red cube'. Suppose we substitute for the phrase 'red sphere' the equivalent and more explicit phrase 'redly coloured and spherically shaped surface', and make similar substitutions, mutatis mutandis, in the two other
cases. Then it becomes plain that any two such Bestimmungs-
komplexe are qualitatively different if any determinable which is
an element in both is present in different determinate forms in the
two. (iii) More elaborate examples of qualitative difference
between Bestimmungskomplexe are the following. ‘Spot con-
sisting of a white circle surrounded by a black ring’ and ‘Spot
consisting of a black circle (of the same size as the white one)
surrounded by a white ring (of the same size as the black
one)’.

Abstractive difference also covers several cases. It may apply
either (1) to universals, or (2) to particulars. In the case of uni-
versals there are two possibilities. (1.1) The example here is
‘triangular’ and ‘equilaterally triangular’, i.e., a relatively in-
determinate predicate and the same predicate specified by a
differentia. (1.2) The example here is ‘three-sided figure’ and
‘equal-sided figure’. Here we have the same relatively in-
determinate predicate specified by two different differentiae
which are not qualitatively different, because not incompatible
with each other. (I can see that this is not an instance of quali-
tative difference, as defined by Marc-Wogau; but it is not clear
to me that it is appropriate to call it an instance of ‘abstractive’
difference.)

(2) The example which Marc-Wogau gives of abstractive
difference as applied to particulars is important. Suppose that
a cube is lying on a table with a certain face $F_6$ downwards and
a certain other face $F_3$ upwards. It is observed from opposite
sides of the table by two observers $X$ and $Y$. $X$ can see the faces
$F_1$, $F_2$, and $F_3$ and no others; $Y$ can see the faces $F_3$, $F_4$, $F_5$
and no others. It is assumed that the positions of the observers
are such that what each prehends is prehended by him neither
as distorted in shape nor foreshortened in size. Marc-Wogau
says that the two prehend numerically different objects, but that
these objects differ only abstractively. Each object has certain
features which the other lacks; but there would be no incon-
sistency in supposing that all the features which belong to either
were compresent in a single object.

This example should be contrasted with the case of two ob-
servers who look at the same penny, one from a great distance
and in a very oblique direction, and the other from a few feet
away and in a direction which is exactly or nearly at right angles
to its surface. Here also the two prehend numerically different
objects, but now the objects differ qualitatively and not only
abstractively. The one object is prehended as round and un-
foreshortened; the other as elliptical and ‘unnaturally small’.
It would be inconsistent to ascribe roundness and ellipticity of contour, or two different extensions, to a single object.

It should be noted that Marc-Wogau insists that, when two contemporary particulars are said to differ only abstractively, it is assumed that the determinate spatial position is the same in both of them. If one occupies a different position from the other, this constitutes *ipso facto* a qualitative difference between them.

Lastly, Marc-Wogau asserts that either qualitative or abstractive difference entails numerical difference; but neither qualitative nor abstractive difference entails the other. (It would appear from the examples that qualitative difference in a *given respect* excludes abstractive difference in *that respect*. But neither excludes the other in a different respect.)

If I am not mistaken, the notion of abstractive difference, as applied to particulars, can be illustrated as follows. Let \( P, Q, \ldots \) represent characteristics, which may be incompletely or completely determinate. Let \( p, q, \ldots \) represent characteristics which are determinates under \( P, Q, \ldots \) respectively when the latter are not completely determinate. Let \( s \) represent a perfectly determinate spatial position, and \( t \) a perfectly determinate date. Consider the following sets of *Bestimmungskomplexe*: (i) \( P \) at \( s \) at \( t \) and \( (P \& Q) \) at \( s \) at \( t \). E.g., brown-here-now and (brown-and-round)-here-now. (ii) \( (P \& Q) \) at \( s \) at \( t \) and \( (Q \& R) \) at \( s \) at \( t \). (It is assumed here that there is no incompatibility between \( P \& Q \) and \( R \), and no incompatibility between \( Q \& R \) and \( P \).) E.g., (brown-and-round)-here-now and (round-and-cold)-here-now. (iii) \( (P \& Q) \) at \( s \) at \( t \), \( (p \& q) \) at \( s \) at \( t \), and \( (p \& q) \) at \( s \) at \( t \). E.g., red-and-triangular)-here-now, (scarlet-and-triangular)-here-now, (red-and-equilaterally-triangular)-here-now, and (scarlet-and-equilaterally-triangular)-here-now. In each of these three sets, according to Marc-Wogau, we have *two or more* particulars, which differ only abstractively.

Now what seems to me odd is to assert with conviction that in all such cases there are two or more particulars. This is of course entailed by saying that abstractive difference involves numerical difference. It seems not unplausible to say that there are two particulars in the example of the objects visually prehended by the two observers of the cube. But, it seems to me most paradoxical to say this, *e.g.*, in the example of (red-and-triangular)-here-now and (scarlet-and-equilaterally-triangular)-here-now. Surely the ordinary way of formulating this situation would be to say that there is a *single* particular, which is *less determinately*
described in the one case and more determinately described in the other. It is not clear to me that Marc-Wogau is logically obliged by his account of particulars to say that there are two or more particulars in all such cases. But, if that is a logical consequence, I should be inclined to regard it as a prima facie objection to his account of particulars.

We can now pass to Marc-Wogau's account of 'one and the same', as applied to particulars where there is no question of difference of date. (The case of identity through time has to be considered separately.)

(1) We may use the phrase to deny numerical difference. We may mean to assert, e.g., that, although there are two different descriptions, yet there is just one object answering to both. (As I have said, it seems to me that many cases which Marc-Wogau would count as instances of numerical difference with mere abstractive difference fall much more naturally under this head.)

(2) We may intend to deny certain qualitative differences between two objects. I think that a good example of this would be when we call two simultaneous occurrences of the same written or spoken type-word 'the same word'. Certain likenesses between two tokens of the same type-word are so much more important than the unlikenesses, for everyone but the typographer or the phonologist, that we commonly ignore the latter.

(3) We may intend to deny all qualitative difference, but not abstractive difference; and therefore, according to Marc-Wogau, not numerical difference. He says that the objects prehended by the several observers of the cube in the above example, and also the cube itself (assuming that their visual experiences are veridical and that they really are both seeing a certain cube), are 'one and the same object' in this sense.

Of course all parties are agreed that, in this example, there is a sense in which it is correct to say that both are 'seeing the same object', viz., a certain cube, and a sense in which it is correct to say that they are seeing partly different objects, viz., different parts of the surface of that cube. Marc-Wogau admits that it is possible to give a different account of this situation from that which he has given. E.g., it might be said that the different objects which the two observers visually prehend are alike in nature, but that they differ fundamentally in nature from the one cube which they both see. And it might be held that each of the former stands to the latter in a certain determinate form of the same peculiar relation, viz., that of being an aspect or appearance of it. That is the kind of account which most
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Sense-Datum Theorists would give. Marc-Wogau thinks that their reasons are inconclusive, and wishes to substitute the account given in Sub-section B of the Introduction of this paper.

(4) Two objects may be called 'one and the same' when we do not mean to deny even qualitative difference between them. Take, e.g., the example of the two persons looking at a penny lying on the table. The objects prehended respectively by the near-by observer who looks straight downwards on the penny and the distant observer who views it obliquely differ qualitatively and therefore numerically. But the two observers would be said to be seeing 'the same part of the same penny'.

It seems to me that all that Marc-Wogau is really entitled to say at this stage of the discussion is the following. We certainly have two different descriptions, viz., 'the object visually prehended by A' and 'the object visually prehended by B'. Let us abbreviate these to 'A's visual prehensum' and 'B's visual prehensum'. The following propositions are certainly true. (i) A prehends his prehensum as round. (ii) B prehends his prehensum as elliptical. (iii) One and the same object cannot at the same time have a round and an elliptical contour. Now, if and only if it is assumed that a visual prehensum must have any quality which it is prehended as having, it follows that A's visual prehensum differs qualitatively from B's. And in that case it follows that the two descriptions 'A's visual prehensum' and 'B's visual prehensum' describe two different objects, i.e., that we have a case of numerical difference.

But, unless this assumption is made (and Marc-Wogau discusses it elaborately elsewhere and seems inclined in a certain sense to reject it), there is no certainty that we have a case of qualitative and numerical difference here. Why not say that there is literally one particular, visually prehended by both A and B; but that at least one of these observers visually prehends it as having a characteristic which is other than and incompatible with a characteristic which it actually has?

Be that as it may, Marc-Wogau thinks that this is a clear case of two qualitatively different objects being called 'one and the same'. He thinks that the phrase 'one and the same', when used in this sense, has no conventional connotation. The most that we can do is to mention certain conditions, one or more of which is generally fulfilled when the phrase is felt to be appropriate. He thinks that the most important of these are qualitative likeness, identity of position, and a common causal ancestor. But he says that any one of them may fail and yet the phrase 'one and the same' may be applied, and that any of them may
hold and yet the phrase be withheld. He gives various examples to illustrate this.

He points out that cases occur where two of these conditions are fulfilled but there is something which positively conflicts with the remaining one. Examples are the two objects visually prehended when one 'sees double'; the two objects prehended by different observers of the same 'ambiguous figure', to whom it appears in characteristically different ways; and so on. In such cases common-sense is uncertain whether to affirm or to deny 'sameness'.

(C) Existence. Marc-Wogau discusses the notion of Existence from page 67 to page 85. After a long discussion he distinguishes three senses in which 'existent' or 'non-existent' or some equivalent pair of opposites can be applied to particulars.

(1) In the widest sense one says of any prehensum that it 'exists' so long as it is being prehended. This is regardless of whether it is prehended in a dream or hallucination or illusion or in normal waking perception. Marc-Wogau denotes this sense of 'exist' by $E_1$.

(2) Among objects which $E_1$ we distinguish those which are prehended in normal waking perception from those which are prehended in dreams, delirium, or hallucinatory waking perception. The former are said to 'exist' or to be 'real'; the latter to be 'non-existent' or 'unreal'. The former would include both the visual prehensum of the person who sees the penny as round and of normal size, and that of the person who sees it as elliptical and foreshortened. This sense is denoted by $E_2$.

(3) If a prehensum $E_2$ its prehended characteristics may differ either (i) only abstractively, or (ii) qualitatively, from the characteristics of the actual visum. In the former case we say that it 'exists in the strict sense'. The visual prehensum of the near-by observer who looks straight down on the penny exists in this sense; that of the other observer does not. This sense is denoted by $E_3$.

Marc-Wogau remarks that $E_1$, $E_2$, and $E_3$ may not be three different meanings of the word 'exist'. It may be that the word, in each of its applications, has no conventional connotation; and that all that can be done is to describe in each case the conditions under which it would commonly be applied or withheld. The conditions for applying $E_1$ are simple. It is applied at any time to all those objects and only those which are then being prehended. $E_2$ is applied when and only when it is believed that an important factor in causing the visual experience was either the actual visum or some other material object connected
with the latter in certain determinate ways. (I suppose that the latter alternative is intended to cover the case of such objects as mirror-images, double-images, etc.)

The conditions under which \( E_3 \) is applied are much more complicated. Marc-Wogau enumerates the following, without claiming that his list is exhaustive. (i) Congruence between sight and touch. (ii) Constancy of the visual appearances obtained under certain conditions (e.g., normal illumination) in spite of variations in other conditions. He admits that there are many exceptions and qualifications to be made here. I should have thought that appropriate \textit{variation} of the appearances concomitantly with certain variations in the conditions was an equally important criterion for \( E_3 \). (iii) Certain causal relationships to other objects already believed to \( E_3 \).

Marc-Wogau raises here the following logical question. Suppose that one could enumerate a rather large number of conditions \( C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_n \), such that if \textit{any} of them were believed to be present we should apply \(' E_3' \) and if \textit{all} of them were believed to be absent we should refuse to apply it. Could we then say that \(' E_3' \) has a \textit{meaning}, and that its meaning is the alternative characteristic \( C_1 \text{-or-} C_2 \text{-or} \ldots \text{-or} C_n \)? Marc-Wogau thinks not. He holds that we should say that \(' E_3' \) has a \textit{meaning} only if we thought that there is either a single non-alternative characteristic \( C \) or a conjunction of such characteristics \( C_1 \text{ and } C_2 \text{ and} \ldots \text{ and} C_n \), such that \(' E_3' \) is correctly applied when and only when \( C \) is believed to be present or \( C_1 \text{ and } C_2 \text{ and} \ldots \text{ and} C_n \) is believed to be present, as the case may be.

Now he thinks it most unlikely that there should be any \textit{quality} or set of qualities answering to these conditions. But might there not be a \textit{relational property} or a set of them, answering to these conditions, which would constitute the meaning of \(' E_3' \)?

He finds the following difficulty in this suggestion. On this supposition what is meant by ascribing \( E_3 \) to an object \( O \) is either (i) that \( O \) stands in certain relations to certain other objects taken severally, or (ii) that it stands in certain relations to a certain set of interconnected objects taken collectively. Now he thinks that it would always be necessary to add the proviso that each of these objects, or this system of interconnected objects, as the case may be, exists. If \(' exists' \) here means the same as \(' E_3' \), we have a logical circle in the attempted definition of \(' E_3' \); if it does not, we have a fourth sense of \(' existence' \) on our hands. (This does not seem to me to be certain. Might not the sense required be \( E_1 \) or \( E_2 \)? Would not a Berkeleian or a Phenomenalist, \textit{e.g.}, say that it was \( E_1 \)?)
On the whole Marc-Wogau is inclined to think that ‘$E_3$’ is a label which is ‘meaningless’ in the following sense, viz., that there is no set of non-alternative characteristics such that it would be appropriate to apply it if and only if all of them were believed to be present. This label is commonly tacked on to a prehensum when any one, or any selection, of a number of alternative but not mutually exclusive conditions is believed to be fulfilled. He compares this to the process of marking certain material things with a cross in order to distinguish them from others. (There are generally reasons for this in any particular case. E.g., a frequent reason is that the things belong to a single person or that they are to be sent to a certain place.) When certain things have been so labelled they *ipso facto* acquire a common and peculiar property, viz., that of being marked with a cross. Similarly, when certain prehenssa have, for one reason or another, had the adjective ‘$E_3$’ attached to them, they *ipso facto* acquire the common and peculiar property of being said to ‘$E_3$’. But this cannot be described as the meaning of ‘$E_3$’, in the sense in which, e.g., the meaning of ‘circle’ is line all of whose points are equidistant from a fixed point.

(D) Material Things. Under this head Marc-Wogau discusses two general problems, viz., (1) the Self-Identity of a thing through time, and (2) the Unity of a thing in relation to its many contemporary aspects.

(1) Self-identity through Time. The discussion of this problem occupies pages 2 to 16 of Marc-Wogau’s book. I think that the following is the best way to introduce it. We have two definite descriptions, referring to two different moments of time, e.g., (i) ‘The material object which occupied a certain place five minutes ago’ and (ii) ‘The material object which occupies a certain place (it may be the same or a different one) now’. Sometimes we say or imply that these are just two descriptions of a single object. E.g., ‘the thing that was in the middle of my writing-table five minutes ago is in my hand now’. Sometimes we say or imply that each is a description of a different object. Under what conditions do we say that there is a *single* object answering to two such descriptions?

Let us state the question in the following form. Under what conditions do we say that there is a single thing answering to two such descriptions as ‘The material object which occupies $s_1$ at $t_1$’ and ‘The material object which occupies $s_2$ at $t_2$’, where $s_1$ and $s_2$ may be either the same or different, but $t_1$ and $t_2$ are assumed to be different?

I think it is plain that there would be a number of different
cases to be considered if the question were to be treated fully. We may say that a material thing has **remained at rest** at \( s_1 \) throughout the interval from \( t_1 \) to \( t_2 \) or that it has **moved**. If it has moved, it may have moved **continually** throughout the interval or it may have **stopped** from time to time. In either case it may have occupied any one position **only once** or it may have occupied one or more positions **several times**. (Several of these possibilities are illustrated by the case of a swinging pendulum.) Marc-Wogau, quite reasonably, refrains from mentioning these tiresome complications of detail. We will confine ourselves to the following two cases. (i) Where a material object is said to have remained at rest at \( s_1 \) from \( t_1 \) to \( t_2 \). (ii) Where it is said to have moved continually and without occupying any position more than once from \( s_1 \) at \( t_1 \) to \( s_2 \) at \( t_2 \).

If the question is formulated in this way, I think that Marc-Wogau's answers for the two cases would be as follows. **Case I.** Here one would be inclined to say that there is a single thing answering to the two descriptions 'The material object which occupies \( s_1 \) at \( t_1 \)' and 'The material object which occupies \( s_2 \) at \( t_2 \)' if one believed (rightly or wrongly) that the following conditions were fulfilled. (i) That for every moment \( t \) between \( t_1 \) and \( t_2 \) there is a particular answering to the description 'The material object which occupies \( s_1 \) at \( t \)'. (ii) That all such particulars are exactly or predominantly alike in their qualities. (iii) That, if there are differences of quality, it is true on the whole (though there may be occasional exceptions) that particulars of this set which are nearer to each other in time are more alike than those which are further apart in time.

**Case II.** Here one would be inclined to say that there is a single thing answering to the two descriptions 'The material object which occupies \( s_1 \) at \( t_1 \)' and 'The material object which occupies \( s_2 \) at \( t_2 \)' if one believed (rightly or wrongly) that the following conditions were fulfilled. (i) That for every moment \( t \) between \( t_1 \) and \( t_2 \) there is a particular answering to the description 'The material object which occupies \( s \) at \( t \)', where (a) for each value of \( t \) there is a different value of \( s \), and (b) the values of \( s \) corresponding to any two values of \( t \) differ by an amount which tends to zero as the difference between the values of \( t \) tends to zero. (ii) and (iii) are the same respectively as (ii) and (iii) in Case I.

The following points should be noticed about these answers. (i) What is relevant is what the person who asserts or denies identity through time **believes** to be the case, not what really is the case if that should differ from what he believes.
(ii) It is plain that, in accordance with Marc-Wogau’s general account of particulars, we are concerned with a series of numerically different particulars, even when we correctly and truly talk of ‘the same material thing’. For, according to that account, two descriptions of a particular, into which there enter different moments of time, are inevitably descriptions of different particulars.

(iii) It will be noticed that, in stating the theory, I have talked throughout of ‘the material object which occupies s at t’ and not of ‘the particular which occupies s at t’. I have done this deliberately for two reasons. In the first place, if I have understood Marc-Wogau’s theory of particulars aright, there could be a plurality of particulars occupying the same place at the same time. If so, there would be nothing answering to the description ‘the particular which occupies s at t’; for that implies that there is only one. Secondly, I understand Marc-Wogau to hold that it is impossible to describe the difference between a series of particulars which does, and one which does not, constitute a material thing without bringing in the notion of ‘material thing’. I understand him to assert that all attempts to do this by means of the intrinsic peculiarities of the former kind of series are either inadequate or circular.

Marc-Wogau lays considerable stress on the following feature of his theory. Although he has mentioned several conditions under which a person would be inclined to say that two descriptions, involving different moments of time, both apply to ‘the same thing’, he does not wish to assert that these conditions constitute the meaning of the phrase ‘same thing at two different moments’. So far as I can understand, he is inclined to deny that this phrase has a meaning, in the sense in which, e.g., the word ‘circle’ has. In this view he associates himself with the Uppsala philosopher Phalen. This may be compared with the doctrine, already mentioned, that ‘existence in sense \( E_3 \) ’ has no meaning but should rather be compared to a label.

If I may state what I suppose to be Marc-Wogau’s view on this point in my own way, I think that it comes to the following. Suppose that \( m_1 \) answers to the description ‘the material thing which occupies \( s_1 \) at \( t_1 \) ’ and that \( m_2 \) answers to the description ‘the material thing which occupies \( s_2 \) at \( t_2 \) ’. Then (i) if a person believes that \( m_1 \) and \( m_2 \) are members of a series of successive particulars in which every one of a certain set of properties \( P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_n \) are present, he will be inclined as a rule to call \( m_1 \) and \( m_2 \) ‘the same thing’. (ii) Unless he believes \( m_1 \) and \( m_2 \) to be members of such a series he will not as a rule be inclined to
call them 'the same thing'. (iii) If he positively believes that all series of which \( m_1 \) and \( m_2 \) are members lack one or more of these characteristics, he will be disinclined as a rule to call them 'the same thing'. But there is no set of properties \( P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_n \) such that (i) a person who believed that \( m_1 \) and \( m_2 \) are members of a series having all these properties would be speaking incorrectly if he said '\( m_1 \) and \( m_2 \) are not the same thing'; and such that (ii) a person who believed that every series of which \( m_1 \) and \( m_2 \) are members lacks one or more of these properties would be speaking incorrectly if he said '\( m_1 \) and \( m_2 \) are the same thing'.

In view of the difficulty of finding any set of properties which could be taken as the conventional connotation of the phrase 'same thing at different moments'—a difficulty which is well brought out by Marc-Wogau's examples—I think that it is probably wise to state the theory in this carefully guarded way.

There is one other point to be noticed before we leave this topic. Marc-Wogau raises the question whether there is not a logical circle in making continuous spatio-temporal connexion between the material thing which occupies \( s_1 \) at \( t_1 \) and the material thing which occupies \( s_2 \) at \( t_2 \) a condition for calling them 'the same thing'.

The difficulty may be put as follows. Suppose that \( m_{12} \) and \( m_{23} \) are adjoined in time and that they occupy the same or adjoined positions in space. Can we attach any meaning to the latter part of this statement except the following? (i) That \( m_{12} \) stands to a certain other material thing \( M_{12} \) (which is contemporary with it) in a spatial relation which is the same as, or only slightly different from, that in which \( m_{23} \) stands to \( M_{23} \) (which is contemporary with it); and (ii) that \( M_{12} \) and \( M_{23} \) are called 'the same material thing'. If so, will not precisely the same question arise about \( M_{12} \) and \( M_{23} \), viz., what induces us to call them 'the same material thing'? If we give the same kind of answer, we shall be referred to \( M_{12}' \) and \( M_{23}' \), and the same question will arise about them. And so on to infinity.

Marc-Wogau's answer is that each of us has a sense of position and orientation which is independent of reference to his own or to other bodies. Each of us is aware of surrounding space as a 'structural whole', in which he can distinguish determinate positions even when no external object is visible, and can recognize them again even when he has moved. In particular one recognizes the distinction between vertical and horizontal independently of the orientation of one's body at the time. It is true that the distinction left-right and behind-or-in-front are essentially relative to one's body. Yet even in that case a rotation
of one's body is experienced as a movement of it within a fixed surrounding space. After having turned through an angle with one's eyes shut one can still indicate the direction, relative to the present orientation of one's body, in which an object, formerly seen straight in front of one, now lies. For these reasons Marc-Wogau thinks that the objection of circularity fails.

I have no wish to deny either the alleged facts or their importance for the phenomenology of spatial perception. But I wonder whether they constitute an answer to the original difficulty. That is concerned with physical things in public space, and not, e.g., merely with the location of visual prehensia in the visual fields of those who prehend them. Now, in spite of the phenomenological facts which have been adduced, does it not remain true that the location of physical things and events in public space is accomplished only by referring them to certain bodies chosen as a system of reference?

(2) Unity of a Thing in relation to the Plurality of its Contemporary Aspects. Consider the examples of the two persons who look at the same cube from opposite sides of the table; and the two persons who look at a penny, one from near-by and perpendicularly, and the other from a great distance and in a very oblique direction. There is a sense in which the two observers in each case see different objects. But we also use language which seems to imply that they see the same object; for we say that the two observers in the first example 'see the same cube' and in the second 'see the same penny'.

The problem presented by these examples can be put in either of the following alternative forms. (i) How can two different co-existent objects, e.g., the faces $F_1$, $F_2$, and $F_3$ and the faces $F_3$, $F_4$, and $F_5$ of the cube, or the round-looking unforeshortened-looking object and the elliptical-looking foreshortened object, be one and the same thing, viz., a certain cube or a certain penny? (ii) How can we say that two observers 'see the same thing' when we admit that they see different objects?

Marc-Wogau says that the problem is most acute in such cases as the example of the two observers of the penny. In the cube-example common-sense would accept the answer that, in the strictest sense of 'see', each observer sees only a part of the cube, and that the parts seen by the two only partially overlap. In the case of an object seen both directly and in a mirror common-sense would admit that what is expressed by saying 'I saw such and such an object in the mirror' would be more accurately expressed by saying 'I saw in the mirror a reflected image of such and such an object'. But common-sense is not inclined to admit
that it would be more correct to say that the remote observer of
the penny from a very oblique direction saw a very small elliptical
object. It insists on saying that he saw the same round moderate-
sized object as was seen by the other observer, but that it 'looked
elliptical and foreshortened to him from where he was standing'.

The essence of Marc-Wogau's analysis is to be found on pages
102 to 118 of his book. It may be stated as follows. The phrase
'the thing \( T \) at the moment \( t \)' is applied, not to a single particular,
nor to a certain set of inter-related particulars taken as a collective
whole, but distributively to every one of a certain class of particulars.
This class may be subdivided into two parts, which
may be called the 'nucleus' and the 'fringe'. For the present
we will confine our attention to the nuclear members. The
fundamental feature of these is that they differ from each other
only abstractively. (The objects prehended by the two observers
of the cube would be nuclear. The object prehended by the person
who looks at the penny very obliquely from a great distance would
be non-nuclear.)

Marc-Wogau considers two alternatives to this analysis. (i)
One is that the thing should be identified with such a set of ab-
stractively different particulars taken collectively. He points out
that, on this analysis, it must be admitted that a person can never
see a thing in the sense of visually prehending it. Such a sentence
as 'I see a cube' will have to be translated into something like
'I visually prehend a certain member of a certain set of particulars
which differ only abstractively from each other'. Marc-
Wogau does not profess to refute this suggestion. But he thinks
that it should be avoided, if possible, because it forces us to put
such an out-of-the-way interpretation on many facts which are
prima facie quite straightforward.

(ii) It might be alleged that the thing is something more con-
crete than any of these objects, and something to which they all
stand in a common relationship. It might therefore be suggested
that the phrase 'the thing \( T \) at the moment \( t \)' applies only to the
one completely concrete member of a certain set of particulars
which differ only abstractively from each other. To this Marc-
Wogau answers that such a set of more and more concrete objects
which differ only abstractively from each other is in principle
infinite. So the notion of a thing as the one completely concrete
member of such a set would be the notion of a common upper limit
to a number of series which all converge on it, and not the common
last term of all such series.

I suppose that Marc-Wogau's objection to this is that any
'material thing' would then be a kind of Platonic Idea, laid up
in Heaven, and once more not the kind of object that could be 'seen', in the sense of visually prehended.

To this one might be inclined to retort as follows. Why not say that the material thing is the one actual concrete existent in connexion with such a set of particulars, and that the other members of the nucleus are all abstractions from it in the following senses? (i) Each is only a part of its surface. (ii) Each is visually prehended only as having certain characteristics, though it in fact has others also which cannot be visually prehended or cannot be prehended at all. (iii) Each is visually prehended only as coloured, shaped, etc., in an incompletely determinate way, though in fact it is qualified completely determinately. This is at least less odd prima facie than to hold that there are particulars which are incompletely determinate in their qualities, and are not merely prehended as qualified more or less indeterminately.

We return now to the original suggestion that such a phrase as 'that penny there now' applies distributively to every one of a certain set of particulars which differ only abstractively from each other. Marc-Wogau remarks that we can ascribe, in a certain sense, to each member of such a set the properties of every other member of the set, and not only those properties which it is prehended as having. Thus, e.g., we can say that the object prehended by a person, who merely looks at a block of ice without touching it, is cold, although of course he does not visually prehend that object as cold. But all such statements are analysable on the following lines: 'This particular, which I visually prehend only as translucent and as a certain part of the surface of a cube (and which in fact has only those qualities), differs only abstractively from certain other particulars which co-exist with it in the same place and are cold'. We might sum up this part of the theory as follows. To prehend in any way any member of such a set of particulars is ipso facto to perceive mediately any other member of the same set, and therefore to perceive mediately all the more concrete members of that set.

Now I think it is important to contrast this analysis with the following prima facie possible alternative, which the terminology introduced at the beginning of this paper was meant to leave open. It might be suggested that the very same particular, which I visually prehend only as translucent and as a certain part of the surface of a cube, has also other properties, such as coldness and smoothness, which I cannot visually prehend; and that it has them in the same literal and non-dispositional sense in which it has the translucency and the cubical contour which I visually prehend it as having.
It should be noted that Marc-Wogau’s dictum that abstractive difference involves numerical difference does not suffice by itself to rule out this alternative. What is required in order to rule it out is the following premiss, viz., that a characteristic which a particular is not prehended as having cannot belong to it in the same literal non-dispositional sense in which a characteristic which it is prehended as having does so. On that assumption a particular which is prehended as translucent, and is not prehended as cold or smooth, must be a different particular from any which would be prehended as cold and smooth if it were prehended at all.

It remains to mention the non-nuclear members of that set of particulars to each member of which the phrase ‘the thing T at the moment t’ is applied. We say that the remote observer who looks at the penny very obliquely is seeing the same penny as the near-by observer who views it from above. But here the former observer prehends his prehensum as having certain characteristics which are incompatible with those which the latter prehends his prehensum as having. The difference is qualitative and not merely abstractive. Associated with this is another difference. The nuclear members exist in the sense $E_3$; the non-nuclear members exist only in senses $E_1$ and $E_2$.

It does not appear to me that the last statement adds anything substantial. For the distinction between these two senses of ‘existence’ is not independently defined; it is introduced and illustrated simply by reference to the contrast between such cases as the two observers of the penny.

(To be concluded.)