inquiries which are not concerned with actuality at all, in the construction of a logical calculus for example. It arises, too, chiefly in connection with hypothetical explanations. The important thing is that an explanation should be simple. All this is a consequence, not of any belief, but of the nature of our inquiry. What are the fewest unverified assumptions that will explain the given facts? We should ask this question even though we knew as an undubitable fact that Nature always goes to work in an unnecessarily complicated way.

The postulates of scientific method are unquestionably in a different position. Propositions that assert that if Nature is constituted in a certain way induction is possible simply assert a logical fact, even though such a constitution of Nature is not a logical necessity. These principles, at any rate, incorporate no demand that Nature should be constituted in any particular way.

Miss Stebbing gives an excellent account of the present position with regard to this special problem. The chapter concludes with a discussion of Hume’s Problem and its Critics. It was clearly intended, here as elsewhere, that the student should be left with something to think about.

Part III., as previously noted, is of the nature of an appendix—but by no means of the nature of an after-thought. These chapters are among the most valuable in the book. The chapter on the Theory of Definition includes the topic of classification and division, and an important section on Definition and Analysis. Chapter XXIII., Abstraction and Generalisation, contains an exposition of the method of extensive abstraction.

In Chapter XXIV. we find, in their proper place, topics commonly discussed in Chapter I. of “the text-books which run in the ordinary grooves”. The last chapter of all contains an excellent little sketch of The Historical Development of Logic. Finally, the student is given a well-selected bibliography.

A word must be added by way of congratulation to Messrs. Methuen & Co. The symbolism has been very well set out, and the general format and typography are good. Some typographical errors have escaped correction—some unfortunately important; but these, no doubt, will disappear in later editions. We hope, and anticipate, that many will be required.

C. A. MACE.


It is far from easy to review Prof. Taylor's Gifford Lectures fairly and adequately in a reasonable space. I propose to devote my attention mainly to the first series and to deal very briefly with the second, because some selection or other must be made and this one

will include the subjects which are likely to be of most interest to readers of *MIND.*

The first series is entitled *The Theological Implications of Morality.* The question at once arises whether morality has any factual implications, theological or otherwise. Prof. Taylor begins by attempting to answer those who have objected to all arguments from value to fact as such. He calls this objection "the alleged rigid disjunction of fact from value", and he proceeds to attack it. The doctrine in question seems to me to be highly ambiguous, and Prof. Taylor does but little to clear up its ambiguities.

The form in which he originally states it (pp. 34 to 37) seems to be the following: "The fact that a certain state of affairs would be very good if it existed is not in itself any ground for believing that it does or will exist, and the fact that it would be very bad if it existed is not by itself any ground for believing that it does not or will not exist". Prof. Taylor then devotes the rest of the chapter to refuting forms of the doctrine which, so far as I can see, are different from, and have no logical bearing upon, the form stated above. Thus (1) he elaborately traverses the view that value is separable from existence in the sense that mere *subsistents,* such as universals, numbers, classes, propositions, etc., could have value. Again, (2) he refutes the view that value is separable from existence in the sense that the value of an existent is independent of its factual character. If anyone has ever held that value and existence are separable in either of these senses he was no doubt mistaken. But has anyone held it, and, if so, has it any relevance to the form of the doctrine which Prof. Taylor set out to refute? Then (3) he deals with the view that value and existence are separable in the sense that our awareness of and interest in values is a purely isolated human oddity which throws no light on the nature of the rest of reality. I notice that Prof. Taylor quotes McTaggart as an eminent exponent of the "disjunction of fact from value". Now McTaggart would quite certainly have agreed with Prof. Taylor in rejecting the doctrine in these three senses, whilst he asserted it in the form in which Prof. Taylor originally stated it.

There are two further remarks to be made before leaving this question. (1) It is not really necessary for Prof. Taylor's main argument in this book that he should refute the "disjunction of fact and value" in the sense in which he states the doctrine on pages 34 to 37. For his main argument is of the Kantian form, *viz.*, from the existence of a moral obligation to the existence of those conditions without which the obligation would be incapable of fulfilment. There is no doubt at all that this type of argument is formally valid, even though fact and value should be "disjoined" in the sense in which McTaggart asserted them to be. There is, however, an *epistemic* condition which must be fulfilled if such an argument is to avoid a vicious circle. There will be a vicious circle unless the person to whom the argument is addressed can know or
rationally believe that he is under the obligation in question without already knowing or rationally believing that the conditions which make fulfilment possible are actual. This seems to me to be the great practical difficulty about all such arguments as Prof. Taylor uses. Most people who doubt whether the factual conclusion is true will, for that very reason, feel a proportionate doubt as to whether they are under the obligation which is asserted in the ethical premise. And so there is a danger that such arguments can be used only in preaching to the already converted.

(2) The other point is this. In Chapter VII. (pp. 261 to 267) Prof. Taylor reverts to the "disjunction of fact and value", and criticises an argument of McTaggart's to the effect that there is certainly so much and so great evil in the world that no state of affairs, however bad it would be, can safely be pronounced impossible merely on the ground of its extreme badness. To this he retorts that, unless we assume at the outset an anti-theistic view of the world, we cannot be sure that the evils which we see may not be elements in, or causal conditions of, a far greater good. This is no doubt true. And it would have been a valid objection if McTaggart had used his principle to establish an anti-theistic conclusion. But he did not; he used it simply as an objection to a certain mode of argument which had been used to establish a theistic conclusion. And here McTaggart was plainly right, even when we admit Prof. Taylor's criticism. For, unless we assume at the outset a theistic view (in a wide sense) of the world, we cannot be sure that the evils which we see are not as great as they seem to be. We cannot even be sure that the goods which we see may not be elements in, or causal conditions of, far greater evils. The upshot of the matter is this. Arguments from the amount of good and of evil which we see to theistic or anti-theistic conclusions must be invalid, because we cannot conjecture what proportion the seen good and evil bear to the total good and evil except on the basis of some assumption, theistic or anti-theistic (in a wide sense), about the nature of the universe.

So much for the logic of such arguments as Prof. Taylor's. Let us now consider the argument itself. If I may state it in my own words, it seems to come to the following. Suppose we assume that each man's life ends with the death of his body, and that all the good and evil which he is capable of enjoying or producing must be confined to the earthly life of himself and other men. We need not take a low or narrow view of the possibilities which this assumption leaves open. We can still attach a high value to intellectual, aesthetic, and moral dispositions and achievements, and we can suppose that the race has a very long period before it during which it may win, for a time at least, far greater control than it has at present over its material environment. We can admit that a man would be under an obligation to sacrifice good which he might have enjoyed for a greater good to be enjoyed by others. But since, on this view,
the only possible goods are secular, it could never be reasonable to sacrifice a good except for some greater secular good. Now the question is whether we do not in fact consider it to be our duty to act in ways in which it would not be right or reasonable to act if the above assumption were true, and whether we do not approve of others for acting in such ways. It is plain that we attach a very high value to certain types of human character, and that such characters can be built up and maintained only by great pains and labour and at the cost of quite genuine and considerable sacrifices of other goods. If each of us be confined to his three score years and ten, the character which he has laboriously and with real sacrifice built up, and which we think he ought always to be striving to improve still further, is a bubble doomed to complete dissolution in a few years. Even before death it is likely to begin to degenerate through accident, illness, or senile decay. Again, if we sacrifice ourselves to improve the characters and conditions of future generations, each future individual is as transient as ourselves, and we have every reason to believe that after a time the material environment will inevitably become too unfavourable for any high form of life to continue. In fact, on the purely naturalistic view of human nature and destiny, every man who makes sacrifices to build up and maintain his own character or to improve the characters and conditions of future generations is embarking on the labours of Sisyphus and preparing for himself the disappointments of Tantalus. Yet it is held to be right and reasonable to behave in this way. Either the purely naturalistic view of human nature and destiny is false or the profoundest ethical convictions of the best and wisest men throughout human history are mistaken. And, if we are not prepared to accept the second alternative, we must accept the first.

I hope that this is a fair statement of Prof. Taylor’s case. It seems to me that the disjunction which he offers us must be admitted; but it is much less clear to me which of the two alternatives it is reasonable for us to accept in the present state of our knowledge. I am fairly sure that, if I were to put the case to my more intelligent pupils or to my younger colleagues in Cambridge, a large proportion of them would answer somewhat as follows. “The ethical ideals in which we were brought up were developed by men in societies where a non-naturalistic view of human nature and destiny was almost universal, and they were appropriate on such a view. Since then the cumulative evidence for a naturalistic view has become overwhelming, and it is now far more reasonable to suppose that the traditional moral ideals are inappropriate to our nature and situation than that the naturalistic view is false. No doubt this does make human life and human effort rather a sorry business, and no doubt the general recognition of this fact would tend to make most men slacker and more self-indulgent than they ought to be even on a naturalistic view. This may be a good reason for not proclaiming our convictions from the house-tops, but it is no argu-
ment against their truth. Our own wiser course is to try to exorcise,
by psycho-analysis and similar means, the ghosts of those moral
ideals which still haunt us from the dead past of our individual and
racial infancy. We can then at least set about making the best of
a bad job, undiverted by the lure of an impossible perfection, and
untroubled by the stings of irrational remorse."

I do not say that I should accept the position outlined above.
I think that a great many highly intelligent people at the present
time have been "bluffed" into regarding a naturalistic view as
inevitable by the real triumphs of genuine sciences, like physics
and biology, and by the impudent pretensions of pseudo-sciences,
like the various brands of "New Psychology". But I am sure that,
if such an argument as Prof. Taylor's is to do more than impart a
pleasing glow of self-satisfaction to the already convinced, it would
need to deal very seriously and sympathetically with the position
which I have crudely stated. I do not find any such attempt in
Prof. Taylor's book, and this does seem to me to be a serious defect
in it.

I pass now to matters of detail. There is a chapter devoted to
Moral Evil and Sin, a subject which, Prof. Taylor thinks, has been
treated too lightly by most philosophers and theologians. One
point in this I will select for mention and criticism. As against those
who say that the feeling of indelible guilt is "morbid" Prof. Taylor
retorts that "morbidity" loses its meaning when applied to a
feature common to all human beings. This is not at all obvious
to me. Almost every human being has at least one severe cold
each year, but this does not alter the fact that catarrh is a morbid
condition. And I should have thought that Prof. Taylor himself
and most theologians would have combined the views that sin is
morbid and that it is common to the whole human race. No doubt
it would be absurd to apply the adjective "morbid" to a feature
which is intrinsic to human nature as such. But it is not absurd
to say that each generation of human beings is born into an en-
vironment in which it is subjected to certain kinds of physical and
mental infection which produce morbid effects on nearly all. To
call a feeling "morbid" means roughly that it is inappropriate in
quality or inordinate in intensity to the object towards which it is
felt. I see nothing absurd in the view (whether it be in fact true
or false) that the sense of indelible guilt is a morbid emotion which
started in the irrational fears and groundless beliefs of our remote
ancestors and has been conveyed to each generation in childhood
by parents, nurses, and schoolmasters.

Before leaving this subject I would like to throw out the following
suggestion for what it is worth. Is it altogether unreasonable to
suggest that the higher flights of morality are as much the business
of specialists as the higher mathematics? In any given society
at any given time there is a certain level of moral achievement
which may fairly be expected of every one, just as every Englishman
at the present time may fairly be expected to be able to do simple
arithmetic without making gross mistakes. Anyone who falls below this standard may very properly feel shame and remorse. In each society and each period there will be certain moral specialists who have the desire and the power to rise far above this moral level, just as there are mathematical specialists who have the desire and the power to cultivate the higher mathematics. Such specialists will rightly feel shame and remorse if they fall below their own much more exacting standard. But the non-specialist in mathematics does not feel an indelible stain because he cannot rise to the mathematical heights of Einstein, and it is not clear to me that the non-specialist in morality does or should feel a passion of shame and remorse for not attaining the moral level of the contemporary specialists. No doubt the average moral level should be continually raised, just as the average mathematical level has been; and no doubt this is largely the result of the lives and works of the specialists in both cases. There are of course practical dangers in popularising this doctrine even if it be true. But that does not prove that it is false. And it is certainly arguable that at least as much harm has been done to morality by pretending that every one can and should attain to the level of the moral specialists as would be done by the general recognition that this is a mistake.

In Chapter VI., on the Initiative of the Eternal, Prof. Taylor argues that it is a "desperate problem" to explain how a man, being just what he is, can conceive an ideal better than himself and be drawn by it. An external stimulus is needed to start the process of self-transformation, and external help is needed throughout the process. This stimulus and support must come from a being who is the actual embodiment of the ideal to which we are always trying to approximate but which we can never reach. I cannot see that Prof. Taylor produces a conclusive argument for any part of this doctrine. (1) The statement that a man cannot get from himself the power to rise above his present moral level (p. 229) is presumably based on physical analogies, and derives from them such plausibility as it has. But even physical analogies are not wholly in Prof. Taylor's favour. The energy of a stream of water can be used to raise some part of the stream to a higher level than its source. Again, to take another analogy, though screws are now cut and surfaces are now planed by machines with an accuracy which the human hand cannot reach, yet the remote ancestors of these machines were screws which were cut and surfaces which were planed by human hands. (2) Can we say with any certainty that man, as he now is, has just such and such powers and no others? If man were known to be nothing but a particularly complex bundle of animal instincts and sensations, it would no doubt be a "desperate problem" to understand how he could take the first step in the disinterested pursuit of truth or beauty or virtue. But Prof. Taylor does not take this view of man. (3) Even if it be granted that the stimulus to a man's moral development must come from outside himself, why need it come from a being

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who embodies the ideal which man seeks to attain? Is there any
more need for that which initiates and sustains moral development
to be an embodiment of the moral ideal than for the drivers of fat
oxen to be themselves fat? (4) I have no doubt that the pursuit
of moral perfection is greatly encouraged in most men by conceiving
it as a life of loyal devotion to a person who is morally perfect. But
I cannot see in this fact any guarantee that such a being actually
exists and actually draws men to him.

Chapter VII. deals with the Destiny of the Individual. Prof.
Taylor explicitly leaves out of account arguments for survival
based on what he calls “the real or alleged facts of necromancy”,
and arguments from the alleged simplicity to the indestructibility
of the human soul. Even if such arguments were valid (and Prof.
Taylor thinks that they come to very little) they would give us no
ground for believing in an ethically desirable form of survival. The
same remarks apply to arguments based on the consensus gentium
and on the prevalence of the wish for survival. The only kind of
argument which is worth considering starts from the alleged fact
that we are under an unconditional obligation to strive for something
which could be realised only by an eternal being or one who is capable
of becoming eternal. Now we are under an unconditional obligation
to aim at becoming complete and free persons. Complete and free
personality quite certainly cannot be secured in this life or in any
mere continuation of it such as the alleged communications from the
dead through mediums would suggest. But unless it were attain-
able we could not be under an obligation to try to attain it. So
there must be a wholly different order of being into which we can
enter after the death of our bodies. The positive character of this
cannot be conjectured in detail; but we can say one negative thing
about it with certainty. It will not be just “one damned thing
after another”, as our present life is, and as the Spiritualistic after-
life would be. We can, perhaps, get some faint idea of it from
certain earthly experiences, such as listening with rapt attention to
music, or the feeling which follows a great self-sacrifice deliberately
made at the call of duty.

I will make the following comments on this, for what little they
may be worth. (1) I am not at all sure that the alleged obligation
to aim at perfection is more than a rhetorical exaggeration (very
necessary, no doubt, for the practical purpose of stimulating weak
and lazy beings) of the admitted obligation never to rest on our
oars or be content with our present level of moral achievement.
So long as we are alive and in fair bodily and mental health we can
always improve our characters further, and unless we constantly
try to go forward we shall almost certainly slip back. Even when
our bodily and mental powers are so decayed that further progress
is impossible and actual retrogression is inevitable we can often
delay the tragedy and impart a certain dignity to it by refusing to
lower the standard. Unless the obligation to aim at perfection be
quite literal it will not bear the weight of the argument for eternal life which Prof. Taylor builds on it.

(2) Whilst I sympathise personally with Prof. Taylor's view that, if any great good is to be attainable, it must be enjoyed in a wholly different order of being from our present life, I feel uneasy on the following counts. (a) May not our conviction of the comparative worthlessness of the secular life, however much it might be improved in detail, arise from the fact that we view it from outside and are appalled at an endless vista leading to nothing? This, after all, is not the way in which those who are immersed in it are affected by it. At each moment they look but a short way ahead, and at no moment (so long as they are in fair health and not exceptionally unfortunate) do they want it to stop within the period which they then foresee. No doubt the skeleton in the cupboard of the secular life is the prospect of death. But, if the "alleged facts of necromancy" could be accepted at their face-value, this skeleton would be finally buried. I believe that if in fact each man had an unending continuance of much the same kind of life as he now enjoys there would be but few moments in this endless duration at which he would not wish that his life should go on. Certainly the vista of this endless and aimless continuance shocks people like Prof. Taylor and myself when we view it from outside. It would no doubt shock the plain man too if he could be made to view his life as a whole in this external way. But is it quite fair to condemn a certain mode of life, which at most moments has given tolerable satisfaction to most men who are living it, merely because it seems worthless when viewed from a quite exceptional standpoint which a few exceptional people take at a few moments in their lives? It is idle to quote Horace at us in this connexion. What troubled Horace was the prospect of growing old and eventually dying. If the "alleged facts of necromancy" had persuaded Horace that he would take up much the same kind of life after death, with rather better Falernian and still more amenable boys and young women, I am convinced that he would have faced the prospect with admirable fortitude. (b) When we assert that to enjoy the beatific vision is man's greatest good, is there not a danger that we may be generalising from the tastes and capacities of a few very exceptional men to mankind at large? Prof. Taylor's musical analogies will serve to illustrate my meaning. Musicians no doubt do derive a high and exquisite happiness from listening to great music well executed. It may well be that this kind of happiness is greater and better than any that the non-musical can enjoy. Still, to the vast majority of men a concert of classical music would be a very fair earthly foretaste of Purgatory, to go no further. Frankly I find it hard to believe that more than a tiny proportion of men would be capable of experiencing the beatific vision, or would view the prospect of an eternity occupied in it with anything but horror, unless they were so radically transformed by death as to be no longer themselves. (c) Even if I assent to the doctrine that an eternity of beatific vision would be the highest good
for me, I am not sure that my assent has not been gained under false pretences. The fact is that I am well enough acquainted with temporal goods to see that they all have great drawbacks. By definition these defects would be absent in the beatific vision. But it might well have other defects of its own which I fail to envisage only because I know so little in detail about it. The defects of temporality, like those of representative government, are familiar to all of us, for we were all born and bred under it. For the same reason its merits tend to be taken for granted. We tend therefore to idealise eternity and autocracy, which at least are free from the old familiar ills. But autocracy has its castor-oil; and the denizens of eternity, if such there be, may for all we know have troubles of their own which do not affect the creatures of time.

(3) It seems to me most surprising that philosophers and theologians should dismiss the "alleged facts of necromancy" so lightly as they do. After all, they are the only shred of empirical evidence that we have to set against the enormous mass of facts which suggest with overwhelming force that the human mind is wholly dependent on the visible human body and perishes with the latter. And, if the kind of after-life which they suggest be as depressing and degraded as Prof. Taylor and other theologians allege, surely it is the business of Theiste to face these facts and not to turn a blind eye to this very embarrassing lion in their path.

I pass now to Chapter VIII., called Other-worldliness. This is largely devoted to discussing the doctrine that the other world is this world rightly understood. The most important point in it seems to be the doctrine of "patterns". The world, we are told, is a pattern whose elements are sub-patterns. These all resemble the world-pattern to some extent, and some do so more than others. To discover the world-pattern we must take account of all sub-patterns open to our inspection, and even then we shall discern it only vaguely. The higher sub-patterns will throw more light than the lower ones on the world-pattern, and the lower sub-patterns can be understood only as elements in the higher ones.

In all this there seems to be a fundamental assumption which is far from self-evident. It seems to be assumed that the world-pattern must be the highest of all patterns. But why must this be so? Is it not possible, and in accordance with most of the appearances, that some kinds of unity within the world (e.g., human minds and certain human societies) are much more intimate and complex and have much greater intrinsic value than the pattern of the world as a collective whole? The unity of the latter has all the appearance of being very loose indeed and of not rising above the merely geometrical and physical level.

In Chapter IX, on the Goal of the Moral Life, Prof. Taylor discusses the contention, most strongly pressed by Bradley, that the life of moral effort aims at a state in which, if it were ever reached, morality could have no place. To this Prof. Taylor answers by drawing
a distinction between progress towards good and progress in good. Morality is not essentially a struggle against evil. Even though all positive evil were eliminated from one's character and circumstances there would still be room for endless progress to greater and greater good. (Compare, e.g., the fact that a man who had got rid of all error and illusion might still perpetually increase the range and depth of his knowledge.)

On the main point Prof. Taylor seems plainly right here, and it is merely a verbal question whether the name “morality” should be confined to the stage at which there is still a struggle with positive evil. Two points which are not merely verbal remain. (1) Granted that good does not simply consist in fighting with and overcoming evil, is it safe to assume that good could continue to exist and flourish when deprived for ever of the stimulus of evil? Anyone who answers this in the affirmative is making a very bold step beyond anything for which we have empirical evidence. (2) Does not mere limitation of knowledge almost inevitably lead somewhere or other to positive error? And, if so, may not mere limitation of goodness always involve some positive evil?

It remains to notice very briefly the contents of the Second Series. The question which Prof. Taylor is discussing throughout this is the following. Are the historical, and apparently contingent, elements, which in fact are contained in all the great religions and which have commonly been thought by the followers of those religions to be of vital importance, really essential? Or are they embarrassing excrescences which might be shed with advantage at the earliest opportunity? This is a quite general question which falls well within the terms of the Gifford Bequest, though it is more pressing for Christianity than for any other great religion, since the nature and life of its founder are an integral part of the Christian doctrine of God, man, and the world. After a general statement of the problem (Chapter I.), Prof. Taylor discusses in turn the following questions: Alleged special revelations (Chapter II.), alleged historical events (Chapter III.), alleged miracles (Chapter IV.), the meaning and place of authority (Chapter V.), religious institutions (Chapter VI.), religious sacraments (Chapter VII.). The book ends with two more general chapters, one on Time and the Historical, and the other on Faith and Knowledge. There is also an Appendix in which Prof. Taylor adds notes on The Rationality of the Universe, Freedom and Contingency, Contingency in Nature, and Free Will of Indifference.

Prof Taylor seems to me to argue quite convincingly that, if God exists, it is not antecedently unlikely that he should make revelations at particular times to particular persons, that these revelations might occur in connexion with different religions whose doctrines in part conflict, and that they might convey information about God which could not have been reached by reflexion on facts which do not include the content of the revelation. Any alleged revelation, even if genuine, will almost certainly be coloured by the
personal, local, and temporal peculiarities of the recipient, and it must be gradually purified by subsequent analysis, comparison, and reflection. The ultimate test is that it should contain something new and unforeseeable, and yet that this new feature should be found to fit in with and to be an harmonious development of the existing religious experiences of mankind.

Prof. Taylor's discussion of the historical element in religion in general, and in Christianity in particular, seems to me to be admirably fair and sound. On the one hand, Christianity with Christ converted into a myth or supposed to have been merely a man would cease to be Christianity. On the other hand, Prof. Taylor admits how little we really know or can conjecture with reasonable probability about the man Jesus from the very scanty records which are available. A Christian must believe that Christ is alive and active, but this does not tie him down to accepting the details of the resurrection or the subsequent appearances as recorded in the Gospels. Both traditionalist theologians and historical critics of tradition are apt to make different but equally unjustifiable forms of the same metaphysical assumption. The former assume that we know all the details of how God has disclosed himself in the past; the latter assume that we know fully and exactly what types of event are and what are not possible.

In the discussion of miracles I also find very little to disagree with. Prof. Taylor makes two important points which are essential to any reasonable discussion of this subject. (1) With regard to any alleged miracle there are always two different questions to be asked: (a) Did the event described in fact happen? (b) Was it a "sign" in the religious sense? Even if it certainly happened it can never be conclusively proved to be a "sign" by evidence which would be equally cogent to the religious man and the atheist. (2) The first question must be answered in the light of historical evidence which is equally open to the religious and the irreligious. But even so the final probability will depend in part on the antecedent probability, and this will be very different according to whether one takes a naturalistic or a non-naturalistic view of the world. And even those who agree that Christ was a supernatural being might legitimately differ in opinion as to whether it is or is not antecedently likely that unusual and to us inexplicable events will be associated with such a being. Prof. Taylor himself inclines to the former view, but his discussion of the whole matter is admirably balanced and temperate.

Prof. Taylor points out that it is essential to distinguish between authority and the claim to infallibility. Authority is essential, not only in religion but also in science. And in morality the individual conscience is authoritative, though it is certainly not infallible. But persons and institutions who may rightly claim authority have a very strong tendency to slip from this into claiming infallibility. This error is certainly not confined to religious authorities; indeed I should think that in modern times the most extreme and ludicrous
examples of it are to be found in the pontifical pronouncements of the trades-union of the medical profession. Even if a church possesses a deposit of revelation which, as coming from God, must be absolutely true, yet it will always be mixed with human interpretation. And no-one can decide infallibly just where the kernel of absolute truth ends and the husk of human interpretation begins.

As regards Institutionalism Prof. Taylor remarks that what the ritualist values is not magnificence, as such, but formality. The antithesis to this is not simplicity but spontaneity. Some degree of convention and ritual is essential in all departments of social life, and there will necessarily be much in any form of worship which will repel individual worshippers. But we must allow for the needs of people who are at a lower intellectual or artistic level than ourselves, and we must remember that the same form may cover a great variety of individual attitudes of mind.

In bringing this review to an end I must remark that much of the value and interest of Prof. Taylor's book is to be found in the long digressions which he constantly makes. These do, indeed, seriously interrupt the main argument, and I have ignored them completely in the present notice. But they contain many of Prof. Taylor's most original and ingenious reflections on all manner of subjects, and they are replete with the astonishingly wide and deep learning which he pours into all his writings.

I have noticed the following misprints. In vol. i., on p. 393, line 8, for dismiss read discuss. (I am inclined to think that on p. 76, line 6, notion should be substituted for motion.) In vol. ii. are the following. Page 22, footnote, line 2, for squares read squarer; p. 84, footnote, last line, for Nobodaddy read (I think) Nobodaddy; p. 152, note 3, and p. 153, note 1 should be interchanged; p. 167, line 26, for act read set; p. 229, note 2 should come after note 1 on p. 228; p. 298, last two lines, for physical in the last but one read psychical, and for psychical in the last read physical; p. 311, line 26, for It is read Is it.

C. D. Broad.


This is an extremely clever book, quite one of the cleverest books of its kind that have been written by an experimental biologist. Apart from its forcible and beautifully clear style, and the breadth of interests it shows, its cleverness lies in the extraordinary skill with which the author has succeeded in anticipating and disarming criticism. It would be easy for an unsympathetic and unscrupulous critic to misrepresent the author by quoting extracts without also giving the author's own "antidotes" to them. Consequently it is not easy to give a faithful representation of Prof. Hogben's position, still less to convey the peculiar literary merit of the book, in a few